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India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

by with No Comment AMT MarketsCommoditiesFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

As Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi for a bilateral summit, the mood in India’s capital is one of profound strategic tension. The core of the problem is India’s massive appetite for discounted Russian Crude Oil, which has shielded the economy from high energy prices but is now causing significant financial and geopolitical risks. This move comes at a time when India’s most important trade surpluses lies with the West, raising anxieties about U.S sanctions and shrinking strategic space.

Trapped Rupee Problem

Since the Ukraine war, Russia’s share of India’s Crude Oil imports has surged from under 2% to nearly 40%. This has simultaneously inflated India’s trade deficit with Russia to nearly $59 billion.

The transactions are largely settled in Indian Rupees (INR). Moscow has accumulated billions of Rupees in Indian banks. However, because the Rupee is not fully convertible on the global market, Russia has very limited ways to use this huge surplus within India. These billions of Rupees are essentially ‘trapped liquidity’ – a problem neither country can easily solve.

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India – Russia Bilateral Merchandise Trade Chart from 2017 – 2024

The Kremlin, meanwhile, is shifting its financial allegiance. It is preparing to issue Yuan denominated sovereign bonds, a decisive step that deepens its reliance on Beijing’s financial system amid a cut off from the Western financial system. This financial trajectory clearly signals the next logical step: Russia will inevitably demand that India begin paying for its oil shipments in Chinese Yuan (CNY).

Structural Risk of Holding Chinese Yuan

India has never been comfortable holding Chinese Yuan or settling trades in the currency. That’s partly strategic as New Delhi wants to protect its geopolitical autonomy and position itself as the democratic anchor of the Global South while staying closely aligned with the West.

But Russia’s financial plumbing is now increasingly routed through China. As the Kremlin becomes more deeply integrated into China’s banking and payments system, its dependence on the Yuan becomes structural. Moscow needs Yuan not only to service Chinese creditors, but also to pay for its expanding list of manufactured imports from China. The Ruble, being a largely non-convertible currency, simply cannot support this scale of trade.

For now, Russia-China trade is balanced enough because Beijing still buys large quantities of Russian energy. But this equilibrium can shift quickly. As the Ukraine war drags on and Moscow’s defense spending rises, the Kremlin will be forced to rely even more heavily on Chinese financing, Chinese goods, and ultimately the Yuan itself, tightening its economic dependency on Beijing.

When that moment arrives, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will be forced to accumulate Yuan as part of its Forex reserves to ensure the continued flow of oil. This decision, born of necessity, introduces a structural vulnerability into India’s financial system as the adoption of Yuan as a reserve currency subject to China’s capital controls.

Risks of Holding the Yuan

China may have both the onshore (CNY) and offshore (CNH) Yuan, but the currency is ultimately controlled by the PBOC, which makes it a risky reserve asset for India. In a crisis, Beijing’s capital controls could restrict liquidity and prevent the RBI from freely converting yuan into hard currency like the USD, effectively trapping India’s capital.

Beyond this financial rigidity, large Yuan holdings also expose India to CCP driven political risk, tying its external stability to China’s domestic decisions. And unlike the Dollar which can be deployed anywhere, Yuan reserves are usable mainly for transactions with China or countries in its financial orbit, sharply limiting India’s strategic and financial flexibility.

Strategic Win for Beijing

For Beijing, this shift delivers a double strategic win, cementing the Yuan as the dominant settlement currency across Eurasia especially among countries squeezed by Western sanctions and it allows the yuan to slip into India’s financial system indirectly, not through Chinese pressure but through Russia’s growing dependence on Chinese finance and India’s reliance on discounted Russian oil.

For Moscow, this is a reluctant compromise: giving up some monetary autonomy in exchange for necessary financial support from China.

For India, however, it introduces a new long term structural risk with a slow but steady Yuan encroachment into its trade and reserve system, operating alongside the dominant U.S Dollar. The oil corridor that was meant to offer an independent strategic opportunity for India is now becoming a channel which Beijing can strengthen its monetary footprint. In this complex triangle, India risks paying a dangerous tactical long-term price for its energy security.

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India Insider: Strategic Balancing Act Comes with Risks

by with No Comment AMT MarketsBehavioral SentimentFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Strategic Balancing Act Comes with Risks

On the 15th of August, India’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a large reduction on Goods and Services Tax rates to boost domestic consumption. The Indian economy is certainly slowing, this as lackluster domestic consumption has prompted the Reserve Bank of India to cut the repo rates from 6.5% to 5.5% in 2025.

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Indian Bonds 30 Year LPS Yields One Year Chart as of 19th August 2025

As trade deal discussions with Washington flounder, New Delhi is being forced to shift economic considerations towards China. The diplomatic relationship between India and China has grown colder, particularly since they clashed on the eastern border region in 2020.

Relying on China also comes with challenges for New Delhi. Since 2021, the trade deficit with China has expanded from $73.3 billion to $99.27 billion USD, showing that India still depends increasingly on China for significant importing needs.

According to Bloomberg, India’s major conglomerates have already established excellent relationships with Chinese suppliers of lithium ion batteries and EV components, although they try to discreetly tread under the radar in order to avoid the wrath of New Delhi government.

The fact is India can sustain its economy and maintain its geopolitical posture of non-alignment by practicing a multi-polar stance with Washington and Beijing. But despite clinching trade deals with the U.K and reviving trade negotiations with the E.U, New Zealand & Australia, and its deepening bilateral relationships with many central Asian nations and within BRICS, New Delhi’s major trading partner for exports remains the United States. Around 18% of India’s exports go towards the U.S, while 15% of imported goods come from China. The numbers do demonstrate an intriguing balance.

While India’s negotiations with the U.S have stalled and appear postponed indefinitely, other Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines have secured lower tariffs with the Trump administration making them more competitive in the U.S. market. These nations are using the U.S for economic and military security, but they also rely on China for manufacturing and logistical needs.

India Faces Additional Challenges with Washington and Beijing:

Indian IT companies derive nearly 57% of their export revenues from U.S clients, making them heavily dependent on that market. And rapid advances in AI and the erosion of legacy outsourcing models are putting India’s traditional profit engines under pressure.

Meanwhile, China is not keen on helping India achieve expertise and manufacturing competitiveness which would threaten its own business model. China wants to make inroads by selling goods to the world’s largest consumer market, rather than technology transfers which would allow India to attain manufacturing supremacy.

Some economists warn that India’s own plans for mitigation of its current circumstances will likely be disinflationary. India’s bond results via yields clearly express concern about potential fiscal costs and difficulties. New Delhi’s focus has shifted towards appeasing domestic consumers, while trying to deal with uncertain foreign partners. Government capital expenditures have been declining since last year, signaling that both corporate and public investment confidence remains weak.

India’s neutrality is welcomed. It’s not anti-Western or pro-Western, and attempts to balance between the U.S and China while trying to forge new trade agreements and ties are a constant high-stakes game capable of creating strains economically and politically. The path forward with the U.S and China will remain complex and it must be worked on with precision in order to help achieve success.