India Insider GDP Savings and Investment 20260408

India Insider: Education, GDP and Personalized Growth a Difficult Balancing Act

Is India Still 'The Country of the Future'?

In 1991, when India’s foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to barely three weeks of import cover, the government pledged its gold to the Bank of England. It was a moment of humiliation and, paradoxically, of liberation as the crisis forced an opening that three decades of socialist planning had resisted. Fast forward into 2025: India is a $4.1 trillion USD economy, the world’s most populous nation, with a moon rover, a thriving startup ecosystem, and a digital payments infrastructure the developed world now studies with envy.

This article asks if India is still ‘the country of the future’ using the same growth determinants framework applied by Professor Manoel Bittencourt to Brazil, and argues that the answer lies not primarily in corruption (though it matters), not in policy failure (though that matters too), but in two structural features that resist easy reform: the vast informality of the Indian economy, and the depth of its inequality.

Does Growth Matter? The 70/g Rule Applied to India

Before diagnosing India’s problems, we must appreciate what it has already achieved. Using the 70/g rule which tells us how many years it takes for income per capita to double at a given growth rate – India’s average GDP growth of roughly 6.5% since 1991 implies a doubling of income every 11 years. That is extraordinary by historical standards.

But averages mask distributions. If growth accrues predominantly to the formal sector – the top 10% of earners who hold formal employment, own financial assets, and participate in the organized economy, then the 70/g rule tells a story of elite enrichment, not a broad based development. This is India’s core dilemma.

The Eight Growth Determinants: India in the Data

Bittencourt’s framework identifies eight standard growth determinants: savings, fertility, rule of law, government consumption, trade openness, education and health investment, inflation, and finance. Let us examine some of each through Indian data, with Brazil as our comparator.

Savings & Investment

India’s gross savings rate has historically been a strength hovering around 30–32% of GDP through the 2000s and 2010s. But the investment picture is more troubled. Fixed capital formation has declined since its peak around 2011–12, driven by a stressed banking sector, weak private investment appetite, and an infrastructure gap. Brazil shows a similar pattern of savings-investment divergence  but India’s gap has widened more sharply in recent years.

Gross Domestic Savings and Fixed Capital Formation. India vs Brazil. 2000-2023

Education & Health Spending

Perhaps nowhere is India’s “policy-delivery gap” more apparent than in social spending. India spends approximately 4.5% of GDP on education and just over 3% on health, and both figures are well below what comparable middle income countries invest. Brazil, despite its own fiscal struggles, consistently outspends India on health as a share of GDP. The consequences are visible in learning outcomes: the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) consistently finds that a significant share of Indian schoolchildren cannot read a simple paragraph or perform basic arithmetic.

This matters enormously for growth. An economy hoping to absorb millions of workers into formal, productive employment each year needs those workers to arrive with usable skills. When they do not, informal low productivity employment becomes the default  and cycles of informality perpetuate.

Government Spending on Human Capital. India vs Brazil. 2000-2023

The Thesis: Informality as Structural Trap

Bittencourt identified corruption as the growth killer in Brazil. For India, the more precise diagnosis is informality and the inequality it both reflects and reinforces.

Consider the arithmetic: approximately 80% of India’s workforce is informally employed who are working without contracts, without social protection, without access to formal credit, and largely invisible to the tax system. This informal mass produces perhaps 50% of GDP. The productivity gap between the formal and informal sectors is staggering, and it does not shrink naturally with overall growth.

Share of Workforce in Formal Employment. India vs Brazil. 2000-2023

Brazil is itself a country with significant informality, but its formal sector share has grown meaningfully since the early 2000s, driven by the expansion of the Bolsa Família program, minimum wage policies, and labor formalization drives. India, by contrast, saw its already small formal sector shrink as a share of total employment after demonetization in 2016 and the disruptions of COVID-19. The gap between the two countries on this metric is instructive.

Inequality: When Growth Passes People By

India’s Gini coefficient – a standard measure of income inequality – has risen over the reform era even as aggregate poverty has fallen.  It shows the signature of unequal growth. The bottom quartile has seen real income gains, but the top decile has captured a disproportionate share of the growth dividend. Recent estimates suggest that India’s top 1% now hold a larger share of national income than at any point since Independence.

Income Distribution India vs. Brazil.

Compare this to Brazil, which, despite its own severe inequality, pursued deliberate redistributive policies through the 2000s with Bolsa Família reaching 14 million families at its peak and a concerted minimum wage policy. India’s equivalents – the MNREGA rural employment guarantee, PM-Kisan farm payments are larger in coverage but smaller in benefit size at this stage, and reach informal workers imperfectly.

The Structural Complications

A purely data driven analysis, as Bittencourt himself acknowledged for Brazil, understates the depth of the challenge. India’s informality is not simply a policy failure, it is rooted in structures that predate modern economics.

The caste system, legally prohibited but still socially persistent, has historically sorted populations into occupational roles and those at the bottom of the hierarchy were systematically excluded from property ownership, formal education, and credit. Colonial de-industrialization destroyed the artisan economy that might otherwise have been a pathway to formal employment. The fragmentation of the federal system with 28 states running effectively different labor markets, land acquisition regimes, and social programs means that a policy that works in Tamil Nadu may fail in Uttar Pradesh.

These are not excuses. They are explanatory variables that any honest growth analysis must include.

What Does Growth Theory Tell Us to Do?

The prescription is not mysterious. If informality is the barrier, then the priority is to make formal employment more accessible through labor law simplification, portable social insurance that follows the worker rather than the employer, and a genuine skill based learning infrastructure that reaches the rural poor.

If inequality is the barrier, then the priority is redistribution that enhances human capital at the bottom – not cash transfers alone, but the quality of the school your child attends and the clinic your mother can access. India has the architecture of such systems; it does not yet have substantive results.

The demonstrators on India’s streets – whether farmers in 2020-21, or youth protesting paper leaks, or contract workers demanding permanence – know this intuitively. They are not asking for charity. They are asking to be absorbed into the formal economy that has prospered around them.

Conclusion: Is India Still the ‘Country of the Future’?

The answer to the question is Yes, and it is both an achievement and an indictment. India has built a moon program and yet cannot reliably staff a primary school. It has produced the world’s most used digital payments system and left 200 million people without bank accounts until recently. It exports software engineers to Silicon Valley, while its domestic labor market cannot absorb graduates at scale.

Brazil, our comparison, has struggled with its own version of this duality longer. But Brazil’s welfare state, however fiscally stressed has created a floor. India’s floor is thinner, and the drop beneath it steeper.

Informality is not the destiny for any developing economy. South Korea was deeply informal in the 1960s, China was an overwhelmingly rural agrarian nation in 1980. Both made transitions through deliberate, state led investment in human capital and formal employment creation. The path is known. The question for India in 2026 is whether the political will exists to progress via focused programs, or whether fifty years from now someone else will write another article illuminating the same structural problems.

Article Notes:

Data sources include the World Bank World Development Indicators, ILO Labour Statistics, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, ASER Centre (India), UNESCO Institute for Statistics, and IMF World Economic Outlook. Growth determinant categories follow Barro (2008) as synthesized by Bittencourt.

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Indian Diaspora 20260325

India Insider: Why the Gulf Remains a Vital Economic Lifeboat

Indian Expat Labour and Recalibration Realities

The skyline of Dubai, once a symbol of untouchable prosperity, now sits under a shadow of regional recalibration. As Reuters recently noted, Dubai has successfully transitioned to a non-oil economy, with oil accounting for less than 2% of its GDP. It is now a powerhouse of trade, high-end real estate, and financial services. 

However, its “backyard” – the Strait of Hormuz – remains a strategic bottleneck. With 20% of global seaborne crude passing through this narrow vein, the recent tensions in March 2026 have forced a shift in perception: the Gulf is no longer an insulated sanctuary, including Dubai where millions of Indians work and earn for their families in India.

Indian Diaspora Gulf Representation

The scale of this “labour export” is enormous. As of early 2026, approximately 9.5 to 10 million Indians live and work across the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. To put that in perspective, that is nearly the entire population of a country like the UAE, made up solely of Indian expats.

A Remittance Driven Economy

As per Government data sources, India remains the world’s top remittance recipient, with total inflows hitting a record $135.4 billion in the last fiscal year. And despite a rise in high-skilled migration to the US and UK, the GCC remains a juggernaut, contributing roughly 38% of India’s total remittances.

For states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Maharashtra, which receive nearly 50% of these total inflows, it is a macroeconomic stabilizer that funds the current account deficit and keeps the Rupee from a freefall.

India’s Labour Market Paradox

But here is the real question, if people return to India due to the crisis in the Middle East, are there any “good quality” jobs waiting for them in India? The honest answer is no.

Youth unemployment remains elevated, particularly among graduates. Engineers in mechanical and construction fields face limited opportunities. Outside IT, and to some extent automobiles, there are not enough stable, high-paying jobs.

So people adjust. You will find postgraduates working in delivery jobs and informal sectors. I have personally spoken to Amazon delivery workers who told me they hold M.A degrees, or that they had worked in Dubai or Singapore before Covid and are now trying to leave again. This is becoming norm nowadays.

Indian National Wages and Savings Compared to Expat GCC Averages

In many towns in India, migration itself has become an economic model. People move to Singapore, Malaysia, or the Gulf, and the money they send back drives real estate, consumption, and local business activity. In many such regions, the labour market feels tight, not because jobs are available, but because the workforce has already left.

The wage gap explains everything. A nurse or lab technician in India may earn ₹15,000–₹20,000 per month. The same person can earn close to ₹80,000 in the Gulf. A private school teacher in Villupuram city in Tamil Nadu state earns around ₹8,000.

While nominal wages are  2–2.5x higher in GCC, the true driver of migration is savings arbitrage , which can be 5–6x higher.

This reflects structural differences in labour productivity and capital intensity.

India has a large pool of educated labour. But instead of becoming an advantage, it has turned into a wage suppressing force. There is always someone willing to work for less. As a result, wages remain low and bargaining power stays weak.

Percent of India’s Remittances From The GCC

At the same time, we are told growth is strong. Yes, the labour force participation is rising, but inequality is also increasing. A large share of employment remains informal and unstable. Inflation continues to erode purchasing power, and disposable incomes remain under pressure.

Right now, for many Indians, prosperous conditions are easier to find outside the country. Yes, the Gulf has risks. However, geopolitical tensions will come and go, and these are short-term disruptions.

Structurally, GCC economies will stabilize and grow again, and when they do, the flow of Indian labour will continue to pursue these opportunities. Because until India creates enough high-quality jobs at scale, migration will not slow down.

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Slomowitz 20260307

End of Defeatism and a Return to Victory

The Iran War Brings a new Strategy Against Tyrants

Opinion: The following article is commentary and its views are solely those of the author. This article was first published the 8th of March via The Angry Demagogue.

We are witnessing not the end of some amorphous “rules-based international order”, but the end of defeatism and a return to victory.

The defeatist attitude amongst the talking heads regarding the Iran war stems from an inability to imagine victory. For the West, as a friend pointed out, victory has been absent from the vocabulary of war since the end of WWII. The “there is no military solution to the problem” crowd can’t imagine that force is sometimes not only necessary but is the only way to move forward. Giving up on diplomacy does not mean that force will attain the compromises that diplomacy looks for but rather attain the victory that diplomacy can never gain.

This is why the NY Times headline is “In War’s First Week, a Punishing Military Campaign with No Coherent Endgame” while the Wall Street Journal decided that the main story of the day is “Dread and paranoia spread across a 1,000-year-old city” – Teheran. The Financial Times quotes one of America’s foremost defeatists, Richard Haass – “America chose this war — and must now choose how to end it”. These are just small samples of the panic that encrusts the progressive mind when someone stands up to terrorists and tyrants with military force. For the defeatist, the “endgame” can never be victory and the deposing of an illegitimate, tyrannical and genocidal regime.

This is the hope of the tyrants worldwide and they have basically been correct in their assessment of western behavior. The so-called “rules-based international order” is not liberal in any sense of the word but a recipe for the spread of cruelty. This so-called “order” not only tolerated the disorder that tyrants and terrorists have brought for the past 70 years it has funded them, too. In South America, from Maoist terrorists in Peru to the Cuban and Venezuelan kleptocracies, they always knew there would be a chance to “negotiate”. Russia’s Putin was allowed to destroy Chechnya and occupy the Crimea, supported by European thirst for their oil and gas and American desires for a piece of the pie. In the middle east, Yassir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority and later Hamas were given billions of dollars by the United States and Western Europe in spite of their clear and present danger to the West by their spread of terror. Hezbollah and Iran run drugs throughout the world, engage in human trafficking and money laundering all to bring disorder and upset the national governments that support them by purchasing their oil and simply giving them planeloads of cash.

Off ramps are needed when victory is not possible but that is not the case regarding Iran. Imbecilic questions that the press likes to ask like “will you commit ground troops?” trying to trick the leaders of the free countries into showing their hand, are just part of the defeatist culture that has occupied the minds of the chattering classes since the French Revolution. That attitude was fine tuned in Vietnam when defeat was the preferred option and victory deemed immoral. The “end of diplomacy” in this and many other cases is not only the moral option it is the correct strategic option. The WSJ thinks there is no connection between an American victory in this and other theatres and the deterrence of China. The ignorant headline that the WSJ news section has today (one of many since the start of this war) “America’s Military Is Focused on Iran. Its Biggest Challenge Is China” cannot imagine that victory – absolute, total victory – is the greatest diplomatic weapon one can have when dealing with a country the size and strength of China.

A history professor once told me that the reason why diplomats hate war is because it means they have failed but the West has upped the ante on that failure by always insisting on a diplomatic (read: defeatist) end to whatever military action is or is about to take place. Diplomacy might be a necessary end to some conflicts but not to one that one is winning. Any description of the current war as a “quagmire” is bad faith reporting at best, traitorous propaganda at worst.

As we have stated here in the past, predicting President Trump is a fool’s game but it is also a fool’s game to assume this administration thinks in the same defeatist terms that has been the essence of the Western “rules-based international order” for the past half century and more. The same is true regarding Israel’s attitude towards this war. Israel too, has been caught up in the same defeatist attitude as it took the word “victory” out of the goals of the IDF. “Managing crises” is what brought us to October 7 as the IDF General Staff pre-October 7 were mediocrities who gained their positions for political reasons and because they “checked-off” two year stints in various jobs in the military.

Netanyahu was part of that defeatist attitude and that is why people still doubt his ability to see this through to the end. But he now has a military that is determined to win and we all hope he, under encouragement from the US administration, will follow suit. The headline that purposely plays to the anti-semitic woke and Tuckerist followers “Netanyahu Finally Got What He Wanted on Iran by Appealing to an Audience of One” misses the whole point – this is as much Trump’s pressure on Netanyahu as Netanyahu’s on Trump.

This is more than “whatever is good for Trump must be bad”. This is a failure of imagination by a large group of modern day “influencers” (yes, the so-called journalists reporting on the war are no better than Instagram and Tick Tock influencers) who can’t fathom what victory looks like and who believe that a military victory of any sort is one that is, by definition, immoral. The failure of diplomacy is not a failure of morality. Rather it is a realization that the moral way requires military force. The off ramp and the end-game is victory, plain and simple. The fact that some can’t imagine what that looks like does not mean it is not within reach.

The flip side of this of course is that the enemies of the west have an inability to admit defeat. This comes from the fact that the west seems to enjoy surrender in the name of diplomacy so these enemies can always count on the west playing the short game and demanding a return to negotiations. That is why these negotiations failed so miserably. The enemies of the west don’t seem to realize that things have changed and that the Starmer-Macron-Obama defeatist wing of the West is no longer making the decisions.

Contra all the defeatist headlines and analyses, the idea that the off ramp and endgame is now “victory” might actually deter the next tyrant and allow future negotiations to succeed.

Disclaimer: the views expressed in this opinion article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily the opinions reflected by angrymetatraders.com or its associated parties.

You can follow Ira Slomowitz via The Angry Demagogue on Substack https://iraslomowitz.substack.com/ 

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WTI Crude Oil 20260309

Fear Factor High in Oil Markets and Outlook is King

WTI Crude Oil Trading in a Storm (War)

Writing from within the storm, it would be easy to feel a strong sense of nervousness as the newest Middle East War rages. However, this is unlikely the beginning of World War 3. Traders looking at WTI Crude Oil this morning have seen the commodity launch over $110.00. But the price has seen a slight dip and is now hovering above $105.00 in albeit fast conditions.

WTI Crude Oil Three Month Chart on 9th March 2026

Behavioral sentiment is nervous, there is no disregarding that notion and taking it seriously. Iran has been firing missiles and drones at neighbors and Saudi Arabia has been effected via some of their oil production. The Strait of Hormuz is certainly seeing an escalation in tension and is threatening to become a sea battle.

However, while the price of WTI Crude Oil rocks higher and day traders either make or lose money fast, speculators wager on short and near-term notions, there is likely a group of folks taking another approach and watching cash prices compared to options.

Yes, the intra-day price of WTI Crude Oil and all other energy sources will remain volatile near-term, but those with a mid and long-term outlook may be betting on optimism and the belief an end game will produce calmer prices. 

WTI Crude Oil is up close to 40% percent when a mid-term perspective is used. Will the commodity remain above 100.00 USD six months from now? Will WTI Crude Oil be above $100.00 three months from now or even one?

This thinking may deliver some type of price resistance in WTI Crude Oil. Certainly, there is a chance of greater escalation. But even though it was widely reported that oil facilities in Iran were bombed this weekend by Israel, the terminals hit were on the outskirts of Teheran, not on the island of Kharg. As dangerous as the war has become and the potential of worse damage occurring, those who are striking Iran do not want to damage Kharg terminals – at least not yet.

As for endgame, Russian oil is being allowed to be sold more easily, sanctions have been relaxed. Thus, it can be said there are international efforts to fight against price spikes. There are concerns about higher oil prices causing bedlam via inflation for the global economy rightfully. However, at some juncture things will eventually calm down. And that is what day traders need to keep in mind as WTI Crude Oil has raced higher, the notion that tactically the Iranian war will reach a de-escalation period is reasonable. 

Yes, there is a threat that Iran plays the an ‘Armageddon’ card and tries to destroy all vital energy resources in the Middle East, but we have likely passed that stage. Iran in many respects, respectfully, has been declawed. Iran can threaten, but can it really bite at this point? The island of Kharg is a key barometer, its facilities remain mostly kept out of the destruction zone, WTI Crude Oil may not spike too much higher.

As for highs, this morning’s jump occurred on fear, however the price has started to calm. We could certainly still see higher values in WTI Crude Oil this week or next, but thoughts about the potential of an end game resolving the current dangers, whatever that may be and no matter how long it will take – may prove to be an important ointment.  Time shall tell.

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Outflows 20250220a

India Insider: Macro Stress a Capital Flow Problem, Not a Trade One

India Insider: Macro Stress a Capital Flow Problem, Not a Trade One

Editor’s note: This article was originally written in January 2026. It has been updated to incorporate developments through February 2026, including the U.S – India interim trade agreement and subsequent capital flow data.

India is currently experiencing what can best be described as macro stress. By macro stress, we mean pressure across the broader economy that shows up simultaneously in the currency, financial markets, and capital flows, rather than a problem limited to one sector or company. In India’s case, this stress is visible in a weak rupee, persistent foreign investor outflows, and rising concerns about equity valuations.

This stress is often misinterpreted as a trade or export problem. In reality, the pressure on the Rupee and the growing fragility in equity markets stem primarily from the capital account, not from collapsing exports or remittances. Even as the U.S Dollar softens – helped by Federal Reserve rate cuts and renewed trade tensions under U.S President Donald Trump, India continues to struggle to attract foreign capital, exposing a deeper structural imbalance.

Source: NSDL (FPI Equity Flows): Reuters and author’s calculations.

Recent weakness in the USD would normally support emerging market currencies and risk assets. This time, however, the response across emerging markets has been uneven. Capital has flowed toward economies linked to artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and commodities, as well as toward markets where valuations have already adjusted. South Korea, Hong Kong, Chile, and South Africa have all benefited from this rotation. India has not.

The Rupee’s weakness reflects this divergence. USD/INR continues to trade around ₹91.5–91.6 despite the absence of a sharp deterioration in India’s trade fundamentals. Services exports, particularly IT services, remain resilient, and remittances continue to provide a steady source of foreign exchange. This brings us to the current account.

The current account represents a country’s net trade balance with the rest of the world, including goods, services, and remittances. India runs a current account deficit, meaning it imports more than it exports. While this deficit persists, it is manageable at present, supported by stable services exports and remittance inflows.

The real problem lies in the capital account, which tracks investment flows such as foreign investors buying or selling Indian equities and bonds. When foreign capital flows into the country, it helps finance the current account deficit. When it flows out, pressure builds quickly on the currency and financial markets.

Foreign capital is neither entering India in sufficient scale, nor remaining invested. Portfolio outflows have become persistent, and this has emerged as the dominant driver of currency pressure. In calendar year 2025, foreign portfolio investors sold approximately USD 19–20 billion worth of Indian equities, marking one of the largest annual equity outflow episodes in recent years. Importantly, this selling has been sustained rather than episodic, pointing to a structural reassessment of India’s growth outlook and valuation premium rather than a temporary risk off shock.

Crucially, this capital flight is not the result of a collapse in exports to the United States. Despite tariff concerns, the U.S remains India’s largest export destination. Between April and December 2025, Indian exports to the U.S rose to roughly $65–68 billion, compared with $60–63 billion during the same period last year. Trade flows, for now, are holding up better than sentiment suggests.

The effects of capital account stress are most visible in financial markets. Indian equities are failing to attract foreign inflows as growth momentum weakens. Market leadership has narrowed, with headline indices supported by a small group of large-cap stocks, while consumption-sensitive sectors such as FMCG remain under pressure.

This dynamic fits squarely within the balance of payments framework described by Professor Michael Pettis. He described, “a country cannot sustainably run a current account deficit without stable capital inflows. When capital inflows weaken, the adjustment shows up through a weaker currency, tighter financial conditions, and pressure on asset prices.”

Indian equities now trade at some of the highest valuation multiples globally, supported largely by domestic retail and mutual fund flows. However, domestic capital is structurally constrained, while global investors can freely reallocate. As Bloomberg’s Andy Mukherjee recently noted, Indian cement stocks now trade at higher valuations than Hong Kong Tech stocks showing the exuberance of Domestic equity capital chasing local themes.

At a deeper level, India’s vulnerability reflects a structural imbalance between savings and investment. Domestic savings are insufficient relative to the economy’s long term investment needs, and the financial system lacks the institutional capacity to consistently channel savings into productivity enhancing investment. As a result, growth has become increasingly dependent on mobile foreign capital – capital that is cyclical, return sensitive, and easily reversible. It is this dependence, more than any near term trade shock, that leaves the Indian rupee vulnerable when global capital flows turn cautious.

Update: The US–India Interim Trade Agreement (February 2026)

Since this article was first written, a significant development has reshaped the near-term outlook. In early February 2026, the United States and India reached an interim trade agreement. As part of the deal, the US lowered its reciprocal tariff on Indian goods from 25% to 18%. President Trump also signed a separate executive order removing an additional punitive 25% tariff that had been imposed as a penalty for India’s purchases of Russian oil, meaning the effective tariff burden on Indian exports had, at its peak, approached 50% before being brought down to 18%.

The announcement acted as an immediate sentiment catalyst. The rupee, which had been trading in the ₹91.5–92 range under stress conditions, strengthened on the news, touching ₹90.30 before settling near ₹90.70. Foreign portfolio investors, who had spent most of 2025 as relentless net sellers, turned net buyers in the first week of February 2026, purchasing approximately $897 million worth of Indian equities.

These are meaningful moves. After 18 months of persistent underperformance relative to other emerging markets, India’s excessive valuation premium has moderated toward historical averages, which may create better entry points for global capital going forward.

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postN104

India Insider: Weakening the MNREGA Employment Guarantees

India Insider: Weakening the MNREGA Employment Guarantees

When the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was enacted in 2005, it was conceived as more than a poverty-alleviation program. It was a direct intervention in India’s rural labor market. By guaranteeing employment on demand at a statutory wage, MNREGA established what the agrarian economy had long lacked – a credible wage floor.

For India, where nearly half the workforce remains trapped in agriculture and align activities often involuntarily, this mattered enormously. Rural labor markets are structurally weak in India. They are seasonal, informal, and dominated by excess labor. In such conditions, wages do not rise organically. MNREGA altered that balance by providing an outside option. A worker who could demand public employment could also refuse exploitative private wages. That is why rural real wages rose meaningfully during the first decade of MNREGA’s implementation.

MNREGA Rural Poverty Data from 2005 to 2018

The figure above illustrates the broader context in which MNREGA operated. Rural poverty declined sharply after 2005, falling from over 40 per cent in the mid 2000s to below 20 per cent by the late 2010s. While this decline reflects multiple forces like overall growth, structural change, and social programs, micro-level studies consistently find that districts and households with higher exposure to MNREGA experienced significantly larger gains in consumption and poverty reduction compared to areas where the program was weakly implemented.

The scheme also acted as a counter cyclical stabilizer. During droughts, agrarian distress, or macro slowdowns, MNREGA expanded automatically, injecting purchasing power into rural areas. This supported consumption, reduced distress migration, and softened downturns. In macroeconomic terms, MNREGA transferred income to households with the highest marginal propensity to consume, precisely where fiscal multipliers are strongest.

Despite its strong design, MNREGA has long suffered from implementation weaknesses. Chronic delays in wage payments undermined its credibility as a reliable source of income. Corruption has generated fake muster rolls, ghost workers, inflated material bills, and substandard asset creation. Social audits which meant to be the backbone of accountability were uneven across states while effective in some.

Technological reforms such as Aadhaar linked payments, and digital attendance reduced certain leakages but introduced new problems, including worker exclusion, authentication failures, and further payment delays. The result was not only fiscal leakage, but a weakening of MNREGA’s core economic function which had promised a dependable wage floor.

Yet instead of fixing these implementation failures, a new policy chose to change the promise itself. In December 2025, this shift became explicit with the passage of the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 in Parliament, replacing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act with a redesigned rural jobs framework.

Under MNREGA, employment was a legal right, if work was demanded, it had to be provided. The new framework reverses this logic altogether. Employment now depends on budget limits, administrative approvals, and notifications from the center, not on demand. What was once automatic is now conditional.

This change also quietly shifts risk onto States. With limited revenue powers and tight borrowing limits, States responded by rationing work and delaying payments. As a result, the employment guarantee weakens, rural workers lose bargaining power, and wages come under pressure. What appears as fiscal control for the central government to rein on capital expenditures on paper thus becomes wage suppression in practice for rural workers.

Almost half of India’s workforce, around 46 per cent, still depends on agriculture and allied rural activities for employment, even though agriculture produces a much smaller share of the country’s total output. This gap between employment and output signals very low productivity in rural work and a large pool of surplus labor. For most of these workers, moving out of agriculture is difficult. They face barriers because of a lack of skills, weak urban job absorption, high migration costs, and social constraints. As a result, the ability to bargain for higher wages is structurally limited.

In such an economy, rural labor markets tend not to be competitive. Employers often face many workers competing for few jobs, while workers have few alternative sources of income. This creates conditions close to monopsony, where employers have disproportionate power in setting wages. In the absence of an institutional counterweight, wages tend to settle near subsistence levels rather than reflecting productivity or broader economic growth.

The consequences are visible in wage outcomes. Daily wages in rural areas stagnate or decline in real terms, failing to keep pace with inflation. Over time, this suppresses labor incomes relative to profits and rents, leading to a further decline in labor’s share of national income. In effect, weakening the employment guarantee shifts income distribution away from workers and back toward employers, reinforcing existing structural inequalities in the economy.

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postN73

U.S National Security, Part 2: Regional Alliances – Europe

U.S National Security, Part 2: Regional Alliances - Europe

Opinion: The following article is commentary and its views are solely those of the author. This article was first published the 25th of December via The Angry Demagogue.

As we continue our tour of the administration’s National Security Strategy we will stay with “part III: What Are America’s Available Means to Get What We Want?” and move to the sixth bullet point: “A broad network of alliances, with treaty allies and partners in the world’s most strategically important regions” and work through the important regions that the strategy documents – Asia, Europe, the Mideast and Africa. For good or for bad we will need to split these regions up since the key point is forming coalitions that can handle their actual region. Sweden can’t be part of a coalition to protect Italy’s interests in the Mediterranean and Japan won’t be protecting Singapore.

Some U.S allied countries, like Australia, Israel and India will be involved in multiple regions helping lead alliances in all areas important to them. With that in mind we will point out the first mistake of the discussion on regions and that is Europe. We will suggest something here that would not usually come from the mouth of a hawk and pessimist and that is that NATO has no real mission and needs to be replaced by a series of alliances that make more sense. While the fear during the Cold War was a Warsaw Pact ground invasion into Germany and beyond which would have required the totality of American and European forces, Europe now is facing a Russia that could not conquer Ukraine in nearly four years of war. That is not to say that Russia is not to be feared only that each part of Europe needs to ally to face a Russian onslaught in its own theatre.

Italy is not going to send troops to Sweden to prevent an attack and Norway won’t be helping Greece in any fight. Turkey is a country that other NATO countries fear more than trust, especially regarding Russia.

In short, NATO needs to be broken up into different alliances where each country will be allied with countries whose fall would affect its national security. The United States can either be a signatory to these alliances or it can decide how involved it wants to get in any conflagration depending on its own interests at that time. It can decide to position ground troops in the countries, supply air cover or, as in the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, help with missile defense and in providing the final blow with weapons only America has. Or – it can decide that it will never participate. One hopes that that won’t happen, but each alliance will need to be ready to fight on its own.

We can include France and the U.K as large countries with advanced armed forces as allies to all of these alliances. France certainly can contribute air power to each of the alliances that are faced against Russia. As for the U.K, it is difficult to know where that country is going but its navy and air force are still powerful.

Today we will deal with north, central and western Europe.

The Baltic Alliance

This would be an alliance that includes Poland, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and would provide cover for land, air and naval battles. Each of these countries, with the exception of Germany, has a border with Russia and all are on the Baltic Sea – a key waterway for them and for Russia.

An alliance of these countries would force them to concentrate on those areas necessary for their defense. An incursion, for example into Finland would force Poland to mass forces on its border with Russia and Belarus (Poland borders Russia in Kaliningrad which is separated from Russia proper by Lithuania) and Germany to move forces to Poland. All countries could also contribute ground forces to Finland as well as naval and air power.

The only thing missing is the lack of a nuclear umbrella. That is no small issue but can be dealt with by support or threats from France or the U.K.

The Atlantic Alliance

Aside from helping the Baltic Alliance, France and the U.K will have major responsibility along with the Netherlands for patrolling the North Atlantic and, with help from Portugal, and Spain the South Atlantic. As the Atlantic Ocean can be considered one of America’s seas, this alliance will need to have the close cooperation if not outright membership of the United States. Canada too, will need to be part of this alliance. We can include the increasingly important Arctic Ocean into this alliance’s responsibilities.

As we move towards the south Atlantic countries such as Morocco, can be included as well as other western African allies of the west. An alliance like that could encourage western African countries to abandon close security and economic ties with China and Russia. The “border” of this alliance would be that squiggly line in the middle of the Atlantic that separates the Eastern and Western hemispheres.

The Central European Alliance

We can look at the smaller central European countries that formed the heart of what was the Hapsburg Empire but are not front line countries bordering Russia – Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Austria, Serbia and Bulgaria – and we have an alliance that, backed by Germany, Poland and the United States, would create a further deterrence to Russian encroachment into Europe proper.

Where, do you ask does Ukraine fall in this European alliance structure? That answer will have to come from the major European powers in concert with the United States. Adding Ukraine to the Baltic alliance might be viewed as another attempt to NATO-ize them by the Russians. However, attaching them to the less threatening Central European Alliance of smaller countries might be the excuse and “victory” that Putin would need to end the war. But we are getting ahead of ourselves here. Ukraine is a problem that can only be solved if the West decides to actively join the fight against Russia (unlikely) or when Putin and Russia get tired of the fight and look for a way out that could allow them to claim victory (more likely than the former, but sadly, a long way off).

The Administration’s concentration on regions and how certain countries can become leaders in support of western and American interests is correct – but the breakdown of the regions has to go beyond the post WWII world. The place of America in the post-cold war world, with a China that wants to challenge America’s economic and military interests and leadership needs to break down old alliances into more manageable and logical pieces.

The wild card in all of this is, of course, the will of the European powers to take their own defense seriously. The Baltic Alliance we spoke about seems to be filled with countries that understand the threat from Russia, but do they recognize the threat to them from the alignment, the Axis if you will, of Russia, Iran, North Korea and China? And of more importance have they yet come to understand the threat to their countries, as they know them, from open immigration and from their own abhorrence of families? The former is something only the governments can handle, the latter though, must come from the people themselves.

A whole generation (or two in many instances) of Europeans have grown up not only as “only children” but in families that have no aunts and no uncles, no cousins and only very elderly grandparents, if that. They have grown up in other words without families. Will the young generation see the importance of families to themselves and their countries or will they continue the nihilistic lives that they parents have “sanctified”? Religious institutions, too will have a major role in this challenge. No amount of “parental leave” and childcare subsidies will convince the young to marry and have children – will only come from a change in the culture. Is Europe up to it?

Disclaimer: the views expressed in this opinion article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily the opinions reflected by angrymetatraders.com or its associated parties.

You can follow Ira Slomowitz via The Angry Demagogue on Substack https://iraslomowitz.substack.com/ 

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India Insider: U.S Credit Crunch vs. Indian Banking Paralysis

India Insider: U.S Credit Crunch vs. Indian Banking Paralysis

When the U.S suffered a severe credit crunch in the early 1990s, the triggers were clear: the collapse of the leveraged buyout (LBO) boom, commercial real estate price corrections, and the failure of Savings and Loans (S&L) Associations, created the need for a $160 billion taxpayer bailout. Regulators, determined to act tough, declared many banks undercapitalized. The result was a nationwide squeeze from 1991 to 1993, where capital shortages – not liquidity, froze credit markets.

Reserve Bank of India Borrowing Rates 1935 to 2025

Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan slashed the Federal Funds rate to 3%, but banks couldn’t lend without capital. The unique twist was that, even as lending slowed, competition among borrowers pushed prime lending rates to 6%. This gave banks a fat 3–4% spread. Greenspan let this persist for nearly three years, enabling banks to earn profits equal to more than 10% of assets. With capital requirements at 8%, the windfall repaired balance sheets. By 1994, the U.S had exited the crisis and returned to strong growth.

India’s trajectory was very different. For decades, the country ran structurally high interest rates, which in theory should have allowed banks to recapitalize through spreads, just like the U.S. However, the reality was distorted by governance failures. Public sector banks (PSBs) , which dominate the system did not use their spreads to strengthen capital. Instead, politically connected lending to oligarchs and large industrial houses left the banks saddled with non-performing assets (NPAs).

I witnessed the aftermath up close in 2019 while working at Edelweiss Brokerage. Shadow banks were stressed, some private banks were crumbling, and PSBs were finally forced to acknowledge their bad loans. The selloff in the banking stocks were brutal that year, Catholic Syrian Bank’s IPO, one of the prominent South Indian banks went undersubscribed. To counter the slowdown, the government slashed corporate taxes from 30% to 22% to stimulate capital expenditure.

Unlike the U.S, India’s stress was on the asset side. Corporates were dragged into Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) proceedings, where assets were monetized through painful restructurings. Piramal Finance bought DHFL at 30 cents on the dollar, and ArcelorMittal acquired Essar Steel at 90 cents. This was the hard clean up the system had avoided for years.

The NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government made the right call in restructuring the banking sector. Weak public sector banks were merged with stronger ones. Yes, it was costly. Households bore the burden via higher taxes, hidden charges, and high borrowing rates. But at least the problem was confronted.

The contrast is striking. The U.S endured a sharp three-year crunch, recapitalized its banks through spreads and market discipline, and bounced back quickly. India endured nearly a decade of paralysis, requiring taxpayer recapitalizations, corporate asset fire-sales, and systemic restructuring. The eventual stability allowed private sector banks to quietly capture market share from their weaker state-owned peers.

The lesson is simple: interest rate spreads can heal banks only if governance is strong. Without accountability, as India’s PSB saga shows, high rates merely tax households and businesses without fixing the system.

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India Insider: Speculation, IPO Mania, and Capital Erosion

India Insider: Speculation, IPO Mania, and Capital Erosion

A speculative frenzy is reflected nowadays via India social media around quarterly results and IPOs. Animated talk about investment potential in India can be compared in some respects to the Dot-com bubble in the U.S which grew in stature into the late 1990’s and peaked in March of 2020 before imploding. Retail speculators in India rush into untested technology stocks hoping for quick profits, often without understanding the businesses. Avoiding a Dot-com like crash is important.

Hedge funds and institutions with their superior supply of capital often speculate across stocks, bonds, Forex and commodities as part of their strategies. However, retail investors should only purchase individual corporate stocks like pieces of businesses which they want to own when they have the ability. Market fluctuations lower can be used to buy quality companies when intrinsic value has been discounted allowing investors with limited funds to take advantage of stock volatility.

Charlie Munger, the right hand man of Warren Buffett, when asked what the secret of running Berkshire Hathaway Inc. was replied, “Warren likes to say, just tell us the bad news, the good news can wait. So people trust us in that (decision making process), and that helps prevent mistakes from escalating into disasters. When you’re not managing for quarterly earnings and you’re managing only for the long pull, you don’t give a damn what the next quarter’s earnings look like.” And this has proven to be advice that all investors can learn from.

Lessons from Yes Bank and Ola Electric:

Many speculative investors rely on technical charts using support and resistance patterns for trading decisions. This frequent buying and selling enriches brokers but rarely investors. Technical trading entices because it often is easier to look at a chart and feel that by glancing at past results you are able to predict the future, but this frequently proves to be incorrect. Fundamentals should always be a large part of investment decisions.

Yes Bank is a classic example. Investors assumed strong fundamentals in 2018, but allegations against founder Rana Kapoor revealed critical issues which proved to be damaging. The Reserve Bank of India stepped into the mess, forcing a consortium of banks to inject equity. Small investors who bought the dips blindly learned the cost of ignoring fundamentals and were hurt financially.
Yes Bank Share Value from 9th of August 2018 to 9th of August 2019 in India Rupees

Another example unfortunately is Ola Electric Mobility Ltd which highlights a similar trap. Ola’s 2024 IPO raised 75 billion Indian Rupees ($900 million USD) at a value of 76 INR per share. It was hailed as a ‘BYD of India’, and despite high valuation warnings, investors pushed share value towards 160 INR. Predictably as cash burn mounted and with no operating profitability, Ola Electrical Mobility value soon fell below the IPO price and speculators who dreamed big soon began to feel like they had lost. The Yes Bank and Ola Electric Mobility cases demonstrate the dangers of investing outside one’s circle of competence.

Ola Electric Mobility One Year Chart as of 17th September 2025

Valuations and Investor Behavior:

From October 2022 to October 2024, Indian markets moved significantly higher, stretching valuations beyond earnings. Even after U.S. Liberation Day tariffs triggered a pullback in India, investors continued pouring money into mutual funds through SIPs (Systematic Investment Plans), ignoring glaring fundamental problems. This raises concerns and creates doubts about whether SIP passive investing is wise without understanding individual businesses.

Investment becomes more intelligent when it is done with a business like approach. As Warren Buffett said, “the stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient.” But patience should not mean overpaying for growth stories. Predicting future earnings is difficult, and paying lofty prices for stocks in the EV, battery, and micro-processing chip sectors based only on expectations can be dangerous.

When competition or innovation shifts, stock prices collapse as Ola Electric Mobility has shown. True investing is businesslike. It requires understanding, discipline, and buying below intrinsic values. Chasing hype, speculation, and every new IPO can lead to erosion of capital. Smaller investors can do better and they should desire to study fundamentals in order to make good decisions.

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India Insider: Working with the West as it Deals with Others

India Insider: Working with the West as it Deals with Others

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tianjin, China for the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in early September, which was attended by over twenty nations. Before India visited the conference in August, Washington D.C had already imposed a 50% punitive tariff on India’s exports. The initial tariff was a 25% duty, but included another 25% penalty because India purchases a large amount of Russian Oil, which the U.S seeks to reduce. An uneasy trade dilemma looms for India.

Many Western analysts quickly concluded that Prime Minister Modi was tilting India towards a stronger relationship with the Russian and Chinese camps, by potentially embracing warmer associations with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and defying Washington’s previous warnings.

Yet, the trade composition and the underlying reality highlights a different story. Despite India being positioned in the global South politically, the nation recognizes its higher value exports – which include textiles, gems and jewelry, apparel, and pharmaceuticals are primarily sold to the West. The United States clearly remains India’s biggest consumer. In essence President Trump holds a trump card.

In contrast, China’s total exports to the global South (excluding Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America) has doubled since 2015. Chinese exports to the U.S were $525 billion USD in 2024, but to the global South, China’s exports grew to nearly $1.3 trillion USD.

As Professor Michael Pettis accurately points out, “countries with expanding trade surpluses with the U.S, use their higher revenues to fund deficits with the rest of the world.”

India Exports More to the West:

India’s trade surplus with United States, the European Union and U.K stands at $72.18 billion USD. If India wants to be competitive with China in terms of manufacturing, it should affiliate more astutely with the Western camp.

Dependence on Anti-Western Countries Hurts India’s Trade Balance:

India’s combined trade deficit with Russia and China is approximately $158 billion USD, which demonstrates how much less India exports to these two countries. India’s overall merchandise trade deficit is $282 billion USD, with a deficit of almost 56% in total attributed to Russia and China.

Service Exports a Crucial Metric in India’s Balance of Payments:

India’s services exports stood at $383 billion USD in financial year 2025, earned primarily from the U.S and other Western countries. Washington has imposed tariffs on India’s tradable goods sector, while the nation’s non-tradable sector has been operating without much stress.

India’s overall trade deficit stood at minus $94.26 billion USD in financial year 2025. Without service exports (predominately from the software services sector), India’s current account deficit would be much larger and the Indian Rupee would face greater depreciation pressures.

India’s economic stability is precarious, equilibrium needs to be found. Solid domestic outcomes for manufacturing and a stable Rupee, including exchange rates, could be achieved with a well-defined calibration that looks West but does not weaken India’s stance as a non-aligned nation. New Delhi should focus on maintaining neutrality and strategic autonomy.

While India may shake hands with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, an important economic lifeline runs firmly through Washington, Brussels, and London. Crucial negotiations are said to be taking place between Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s team and President Trump’s White House behind closed doors. New Delhi could become vulnerable if it does not find adequate solutions. President Trump has recently reiterated his friendship with the Prime Minister Modi, perhaps an agreement can be produced in the mid-term.

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India Insider: Women in Agriculture Need Manufacturing Power

India Insider: Women in Agriculture Need Manufacturing Power

India has long been a society that has neglected Women’s Empowerment. While various states pursue proactive policies to enhance the role of women in society, their inclusion in the job market and ability to have financial independence is still lacking.

Small Scale Farm in Tiruvannamalai, India

In the suburbs of Tiruvannamalai City, in Tamil Nadu, Mrs. Revathi runs an agricultural farm where she grows rice, flowers, and vegetables. She sells them to local commission agents or directly to customers from her farm. Mrs. Revathi, who lost her husband in 2019, has two daughters, both of whom are educated and working. One of the daughters is getting married. She said that although agriculture helps her family earn money, it does not lift them out of the poverty trap because of uneven flower cultivation. The land is becoming less and less suitable for irrigation – a matter that worries her greatly too. Flowers are one of the major sources of income for many farming families in Tiruvannamalai City in Tamil Nadu.

This is just a small example of the challenges faced by women working in agriculture.
According to recent Periodic Labor Force Surveys, 64.4% of women in India work in agriculture, compared to only 36.3% of men.

Labor Workforce Percentage in India per Gender

Self employment and Access to Credit is not the Solution:

Many argue that self-employment and steady access to credit via microfinance institutions will help women become entrepreneurs and create movement up the social ladder. This is true in some cases, but many women struggle with raising families in their husband’s absence, and when working on farms where agricultural productivity is lopsided or unfit for growing vegetables or corn, times remain difficult.

First of all, why do women choose agriculture and remain small-time sellers? Because they are not able to find employment easily in formal sectors like manufacturing or other service oriented businesses.

Even within related agricultural sectors, women employed in vegetable processing plants, or value-added goods like masala manufacturing and tomato sauce production companies earn higher wages.

Unfortunately, low productivity and long spells of inactivity render agricultural workers significantly underemployed periodically. They are stuck, with nowhere else to go. Unlike in East Asian nations, which created mass employment through dynamic exports of manufactured goods, the Indian manufacturing sector’s low productivity makes it globally uncompetitive.

Manufacturing as a Solution for Women Empowerment:

Across Asia manufacturing has proven to be a powerful driver for upwards mobility. Incomes have risen, poverty has declined, and women are central parts of this transformation. In Vietnam, where a factory boom has been especially momentous, more than 68 percent of women and girls over 15 years of age are working for pay in some capacity, this according to data compiled by the World Bank. In China the rate is 63 percent, in Thailand 59 percent, and in Indonesia 53 percent of workers in manufacturing are women. Yet in India, less than 33 percent of women account for the workforce in recorded in official surveys.

In a pattern demonstrated in many industrializing societies, when more women gain jobs, families promptly invest further in education for girls. Manufacturing also lifts household spending power, fueling economic expansion that encourages investors to build more factories, providing additional jobs and reciprocal wealth creation. India is missing out on this dynamic manufacturing growth and is failing to broadly participate in the spread of improved industrialization which has helped bolster fortunes in many Asian economies and benefitted families. A vital component for a stronger Indian economy necessitates the empowerment of women.

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India Insider: Labor Productivity and Rising Household Debt

India Insider: Labor Productivity and Rising Household Debt

The desire for India to become a fast growing economy can be alluring, but without proper distribution of income and improved labor codes, this remains a major challenge to achieve. During coronavirus, acute problems were faced by those working in private enterprises. While some businesses and institutions supported their employees, many people were left behind without social protective measures.

According to Business Line newspaper analysis, from July 2022 to June 2023, an average salaried Indian male made 20,666 Rupees ($236 USD) and a woman made 15,722 Rupees ( $180 USD) per month.

Experience tells us that lower salaries in the rural areas are pervasive. Many private sector nurses, schoolteachers, and other service workers earn less than the international poverty line of $3 per day (around 250 Rupees per current Forex). Sometimes due to extensive workforce supply, some educated people must work blue collar service jobs additionally to make their ends meet.

Agriculture and Low Productivity:

Wage disparity and underemployment exists rampantly. Half of India’s labor force works in agriculture, where productivity is poor. In agriculture, farmers are both producers and consumers. There are barriers in food supply and demand for agricultural products. Farmers need access to local markets where their buyers can afford to purchase their produce. Without solid markets or better road infrastructure to reach them, many rural areas have less incentive to improve productivity.

As a result, many farmers produce low volumes. This is also one of the reasons why New Delhi is reluctant to permit U.S imports of agricultural and dairy products. Smaller farmers cannot afford to invest in education, which hinders their efforts to move into industries with higher wages. Without increasing labor productivity and better opportunities, most of the population will continue to work in agriculture.

Stagnant Wages, Informal Work and Problems in Micro-Finance:

India’s Micro-Finance Lenders Culminative Returns Past Year

A large portion of the workforce is employed via informal and low-paying jobs. If wage growth does not keep pace with increased productivity, domestic consumption will remain weak, making the economy more fragile during global downturns. Drivers and gig workers provide some insights because of their inability to make ends meet. Minimum wage policies are lacking for many gig workers. Employees work higher hours in these enterprises. Yet another reason why Indian households prefer to prepare their children for government jobs.

India’s micro lending industry is under stress as delinquencies rise at an alarming pace. This has prompted the Reserve Bank of India to intervene and impose fines on lenders charging excessive interest rates. Loan disbursements shrank 13.5% year-on-year, and shares of some small finance banks have fallen, this as they have been forced to set aside higher provisions for bad loans.

Total loans outstanding in the industry are around 3.75 lakh crore rupees ($43 billion USD) in financial year 2025, with non-housing retail loans accounting for nearly 55% of total household debt. Small ticket loans were meant to ensure financial inclusion in underserved areas. The RBI defines microfinance as collateral-free loans to households with annual incomes of up to 3 lakh Rupees (approximately $3,400 USD).

But when wages do not rise in line with inflation, households begin to borrow to cover deficits, often at high interest rates. This creates risk for small finance banks when borrowers default, besides many consumers who are clearly struggling. A bank employee in Tamil Nadu has said loan disbursements are now scrutinized more closely, and applicants with monthly EMIs – equated monthly installments – above 10,000 Rupees ($115 USD) are no longer eligible for micro-loans.

Job creation in the Manufacturing:

Despite media portrayals of India’s manufacturing ascent, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik offered a compelling remark paraphrased here which points out obstacles ahead, ‘what made manufacturing a vehicle for transformational growth was its ability to generate productivity while drawing unskilled labor from traditional farming’. Rodrik seems to believe manufacturing remains a lower income sector in India due to its large work force and inability to transform efficiently, while also facing globalization problems from other Asian competitors.

The reason why manufacturing companies in India can pay lower salaries is because of high unemployment ratios and a steady supply of new graduates every year, making it easy to find new employees. Wages don’t see much improvement because workers are replaced easily. Many employees working in manufacturing actually have engineering and Masters’ degree backgrounds. Their average salary is around 15,000 Rupees a month ($170 USD), the same amount paid to low skilled employees who have technician diplomas.

India needs to work on improving core manufacturing capabilities, creating better infrastructure via land reforms and logistical capabilities. Implementing a fair minimum wage policy would also influence the economy via better household wages. Yes, inflation is a concern, but India’s aspiration to become a $10 trillion economy will remain hard to attain unless coordinated policy changes occur.

Notes: 1 USD = 87.5 Rupees