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India Insider: Agriculture Still Traps Nation’s Workforce

by with No Comment AssetsBehavioral SentimentFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Agriculture Still Traps Nation's Workforce

A Field Survey in South India’s Agricultural Towns

India’s growth story is usually told through noteworthy headline numbers. Yet beneath these aggregates lies a persistent imbalance, agriculture continues to employ a large share of the workforce, while contributing a much smaller share of output. This gap shapes income stability, consumption patterns, and the complicated experience of growth across much of the country for many people.

This essay uses field observations comparing two major agricultural towns in Tamil Nadu State in India, Tiruvannamalai and Kallakurichi. After analyzing their respective data and examining how this imbalance plays out on the ground, I offer my perspective.

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Typical Agricultural Field in Southern India

Tiruvannamalai: Growth Without Employment Transformation

In Tiruvannamalai district, I visited several areas where housing conditions were poor and informal settlements were widespread. I have visited many households here since 2023. These conditions are now changing, but not in a way that fundamentally transforms employment.

Capital inflows from the neighboring State of Andhra Pradesh have fueled a real estate boom and expanded services such as lodging, restaurants, and transport. While this has altered the physical landscape and raised asset values, it has not created stable non-farm jobs at scale. Employment remains largely informal, seasonal, and low-paid, leaving the underlying agricultural labor trap intact.

Although Tiruvannamalai exhibits a relatively high services share in district GDP, the income generated by this sector accrues from a narrow group of asset owners, intermediaries, and rent-seekers. As a result, per capita income figures overstate the extent of broad-based welfare. A large share of the workforce remains engaged in low-wage service activities with limited income security.

Kallakurichi: Agricultural Dependence, Weaker Services

In Kallakurichi district, the structural imbalance is even more pronounced. Agriculture accounts for a noticeably larger share of district GDP than in Tiruvannamalai, while the services share is correspondingly lower. District level GDDP and sectoral composition data from the Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Tamil Nadu (2022–23 provisional, current prices), show that agriculture contributes roughly one-fifth of district output, even as a disproportionately large share of the workforce continues to depend on this type of work for income.

This high dependence on agriculture results in extremely low output per worker, widespread disguised unemployment, and chronically weak incomes. Growth exists, but it is concentrated in activities that do not absorb labor effectively.

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Gross Domestic District Product Comparison of Agriculture versus Non-Agriculture

Core Problem: Growth Composition, Not Growth Absence

The core structural problem in districts like Tiruvannamalai and Kallakurichi is therefore not the absence of growth, but its composition. Too many workers remain tied to a sector that generates relatively little value. Services and industry have expanded, but not in a manner that absorbs surplus rural labor at scale.

As long as labor remains trapped in low productivity farming, while non-farm sectors fail to provide stable employment opportunities, headline income measures will continue to overstate actual welfare.

Consumption Consequences of Agricultural Dependence

This imbalance has direct consequences for consumption. Towns that depend heavily on agriculture tend to exhibit weak and uneven consumption patterns. Farm incomes are inherently volatile, driven by fluctuations in commodity prices, weather conditions, and market access. In many cases, farmers are forced to sell produce at a discount, incur outright losses, or delay sales under distressing conditions. Only intermittently do they realize meaningful profits.

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Chart Comparing Towns of Tiruvannamalai and Kallakurichi in Tamil Nadu

This volatility translates into cautious spending behavior. Consumption rises in short bursts following a good season, but thereafter contracts sharply. This pattern is clearly visible in districts such as Tiruvannamalai and Kallakurichi, where agricultural dependence suppresses steady consumption despite occasional income windfalls.

The same dynamic is visible at State level. Across Tamil Nadu, agriculture employs over 40 percent of the labor force, while contributing a far smaller share of output. The statistics exhibited at the district level are therefore not an isolated phenomenon, but a systemic one.

National Structural Imbalance

Zooming out further, what is visible in Tiruvannamalai and Kallakurichi mirrors India’s broader structural imbalance. Nationally, agriculture employs close to half the workforce, but contributes less than a fifth of GDP. This gap suppresses incomes, weakens consumption, and reflects India’s limited success in industrializing at scale.

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India Agriculture as Percent of GDP from 1990s into 2020s

Services have grown rapidly, but they remain reliant on capital and skill intensive, and unable to absorb surplus rural labor in large numbers. As a result, economic growth continues without broad based prosperity. Headline GDP numbers improve, but the underlying structure remains fragile.

India’s central economic scrouge is growth without labor mobility. Until workers move out of low productivity agriculture jobs and into stable non-farm employment at scale, income volatility and weak consumption will remain defining features of the economy. Regardless of how strong the headline growth numbers appear, a national challenge remains.

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India Insider: Weakening the MNREGA Employment Guarantees

by with No Comment Featured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsIndia

India Insider: Weakening the MNREGA Employment Guarantees

When the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was enacted in 2005, it was conceived as more than a poverty-alleviation program. It was a direct intervention in India’s rural labor market. By guaranteeing employment on demand at a statutory wage, MNREGA established what the agrarian economy had long lacked – a credible wage floor.

For India, where nearly half the workforce remains trapped in agriculture and align activities often involuntarily, this mattered enormously. Rural labor markets are structurally weak in India. They are seasonal, informal, and dominated by excess labor. In such conditions, wages do not rise organically. MNREGA altered that balance by providing an outside option. A worker who could demand public employment could also refuse exploitative private wages. That is why rural real wages rose meaningfully during the first decade of MNREGA’s implementation.

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MNREGA Rural Poverty Data from 2005 to 2018

The figure above illustrates the broader context in which MNREGA operated. Rural poverty declined sharply after 2005, falling from over 40 per cent in the mid 2000s to below 20 per cent by the late 2010s. While this decline reflects multiple forces like overall growth, structural change, and social programs, micro-level studies consistently find that districts and households with higher exposure to MNREGA experienced significantly larger gains in consumption and poverty reduction compared to areas where the program was weakly implemented.

The scheme also acted as a counter cyclical stabilizer. During droughts, agrarian distress, or macro slowdowns, MNREGA expanded automatically, injecting purchasing power into rural areas. This supported consumption, reduced distress migration, and softened downturns. In macroeconomic terms, MNREGA transferred income to households with the highest marginal propensity to consume, precisely where fiscal multipliers are strongest.

Despite its strong design, MNREGA has long suffered from implementation weaknesses. Chronic delays in wage payments undermined its credibility as a reliable source of income. Corruption has generated fake muster rolls, ghost workers, inflated material bills, and substandard asset creation. Social audits which meant to be the backbone of accountability were uneven across states while effective in some.

Technological reforms such as Aadhaar linked payments, and digital attendance reduced certain leakages but introduced new problems, including worker exclusion, authentication failures, and further payment delays. The result was not only fiscal leakage, but a weakening of MNREGA’s core economic function which had promised a dependable wage floor.

Yet instead of fixing these implementation failures, a new policy chose to change the promise itself. In December 2025, this shift became explicit with the passage of the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 in Parliament, replacing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act with a redesigned rural jobs framework.

Under MNREGA, employment was a legal right, if work was demanded, it had to be provided. The new framework reverses this logic altogether. Employment now depends on budget limits, administrative approvals, and notifications from the center, not on demand. What was once automatic is now conditional.

This change also quietly shifts risk onto States. With limited revenue powers and tight borrowing limits, States responded by rationing work and delaying payments. As a result, the employment guarantee weakens, rural workers lose bargaining power, and wages come under pressure. What appears as fiscal control for the central government to rein on capital expenditures on paper thus becomes wage suppression in practice for rural workers.

Almost half of India’s workforce, around 46 per cent, still depends on agriculture and allied rural activities for employment, even though agriculture produces a much smaller share of the country’s total output. This gap between employment and output signals very low productivity in rural work and a large pool of surplus labor. For most of these workers, moving out of agriculture is difficult. They face barriers because of a lack of skills, weak urban job absorption, high migration costs, and social constraints. As a result, the ability to bargain for higher wages is structurally limited.

In such an economy, rural labor markets tend not to be competitive. Employers often face many workers competing for few jobs, while workers have few alternative sources of income. This creates conditions close to monopsony, where employers have disproportionate power in setting wages. In the absence of an institutional counterweight, wages tend to settle near subsistence levels rather than reflecting productivity or broader economic growth.

The consequences are visible in wage outcomes. Daily wages in rural areas stagnate or decline in real terms, failing to keep pace with inflation. Over time, this suppresses labor incomes relative to profits and rents, leading to a further decline in labor’s share of national income. In effect, weakening the employment guarantee shifts income distribution away from workers and back toward employers, reinforcing existing structural inequalities in the economy.

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India Insider: Strategic Memory and Why Unilateral Power is Resisted

by with One Comment Behavioral SentimentBusinessFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Strategic Memory and Why Unilateral Power is Resisted

After Independence, India was often described as “tilting” toward the Soviet Union. In reality, this was the outcome of India’s pursuit of Non-Alignment at a time when the United States was actively backing perceived rogue actors in South Asia, most notably Pakistan. What appeared as ideological preference was, in fact, strategic necessity born of hard experience.

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The Soviet Union supported India on core security concerns when few others would. The first major Soviet defense deal was not merely a weapons sale. It included licensed production in India through Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, full technology transfer, and made India the first non-Communist country to receive the MiG-21. This distinction mattered. India was treated as a sovereign partner capable of absorbing technology, not as a dependent client expected to align unquestioningly.

By contrast, Washington’s alignment with Pakistan was driven by Cold War geopolitics rather than South Asian stability. Despite repeated military coups, wars with India, and regional destabilization, the United States armed Pakistan, provided diplomatic cover during conflicts, and sustained the relationship through military rule and nuclear proliferation. These experiences deeply shaped India’s strategic culture and explain its enduring emphasis on autonomy, redundancy, and diversified partnerships rather than alliance dependency.

This history is one of the central reasons India resists Washington dictating regional dynamics. South Asia, in New Delhi’s view, is not a chessboard for external powers to reorder at will.

Democratic Republic of the Congo Example

The same pattern is visible beyond Asia. Take the Democratic Republic of Congo. After decades of horrific colonial exploitation, the Belgians realized by the mid-20th century that they could not hold on indefinitely and exited abruptly, having never prepared the country for self-rule. What they left behind was not independence, but a political vacuum. The United States and the United Nations intervened, but their actions were shaped less by concern for Congolese society than by geopolitical rivalry, ideological competition, and racial hierarchy.

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba destroyed the Republic of the Congo’s (as it was known then) only credible attempt at building a unified nationalist state at independence. The dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko that followed did not merely fail to develop institutions; it actively hollowed them out. Corruption became a governing principle, loyalty replaced competence, and the state turned into a vehicle for extraction. Today’s instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not a governance failure in isolation—it is the predictable outcome of a political system designed to rule without building state capacity. For countries like India, this is not ancient history, it is a warning.

Washington’s unilateralism reinforces this mistrust:

The recent military operation to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro without U.S Congress authorization, international legal justification, or an imminent threat would have been unthinkable as recently as the first Trump administration. It became possible in 2026 only because of congressional capitulation, judicial immunity, and the transformation of an apolitical defense establishment into a politicized instrument of executive power. To much of the world, this signals that restraint is no longer embedded in American decision making.

Europe exposes another contradiction. The post war order was built on liberal democracy and collective security through NATO. When that order is weakened by unilateral action, trust erodes, even among allies expected to align automatically.

Even before Trump, the U.S – India relationship remained cordial rather than fully strategic. Before 9/11, India was the most natural regional ally against Al-Qaeda, yet Washington lacked patience and local understanding to navigate India’s complex democracy and nationalism. That failure was not tactical, it was conceptual.

India’s neutrality today is deliberate:

It prioritizes diplomacy over military actions that violate international law. India sees a multipolar world emerging, not as disorder, but as the end of unchecked unilateral supremacy. This is not ambiguity. It is a strategic memory.

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India Insider: Growth Without Development an Inequality Trap

by with No Comment AssetsBehavioral SentimentFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Growth Without Development an Inequality Trap

An India and Latin America Comparison

India’s strong headline growth reflects a rapid expansion of aggregate output. Yet this growth often coexists with weak job creation, uneven human capital formation, and persistent inequality. This coexistence is not a temporary anomaly. It reflects a deeper political & economic structure in which inequality itself constrains development, rather than merely emerging as a byproduct of slow growth.

This mechanism is similar to Latin America. In unequal political economies, rising income concentration encourages elites to exit from public systems like education, healthcare, transport, and social insurance. Once affluent groups no longer depend on public provision, political incentives to strengthen these systems weaken fiscal capacity erodes, public services deteriorate, and inequality becomes self-reinforcing.

Latin America’s experience illustrates this dynamic clearly. Despite periods of high growth driven by industrialization, commodity booms, or financial liberalization, many countries failed to build universal public systems. Elites relied on private schools, private healthcare, and offshore financial arrangements, while the majority depended on chronically underfunded public institutions. The result was a narrow tax base, weak state capacity, and growth that was volatile and socially shallow.

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Figure concept adapted from book, “The cost of Inequality in Latin America” by Diego Sanchez-Ancochea

India increasingly shows signs of a similar trajectory. Public spending on health remains around 1.2 – 1.4 percent of GDP. Government expenditures on education is around 3 percent of GDP, which is low not just by OECD standards, but comparative to many middle income Latin American economies. Out of pocket healthcare costs account for roughly 45 – 50 percent of total health spending in India, among the highest shares globally. These figures point to a systematic private substitution over public provisions, a hallmark of elite exit.

Implications of Elite Leaving Public Systems

Withdrawal from public systems has direct implications for growth quality. When education and healthcare remain uneven, the diffusion of skills and productivity across the workforce is limited. Growth then concentrates in capital intensive or skill intensive enclaves, while large segments of the labor force remain trapped in low productivity informal employment. India’s employment elasticity of growth has remained structurally low, estimated at below 0.2 in recent decades, meaning that even high output growth generates relatively few jobs.

This structural weakness is reinforced by the nature of Indian capitalism. Like much of Latin America, India’s growth model rewards scale, access, and regulatory navigation more than technological risk taking. Firms that can manage land acquisition, compliance complexity, market concentration, and political connections earn higher returns than those that invest in frontier innovation. Private investment in research and development remains modest: total R&D spending in India is around 0.6 – 0.7 percent of GDP, with a particularly weak contribution from the private sector. By contrast, East Asian economies that achieved solid employment growth invested 2.0 – 4.0 percent of GDP in R&D during their catch up phases.

This outcome produces poor job growth and entrenched dual labor markets, which is also another Latin American hallmark. A relatively small formal sector benefits from capital strengthening and productivity gains, but the majority of workers remain in informal employment with stagnant wages and weak social protection. Gradually this weakens domestic demand and increases reliance on credit, exports, or asset inflation to sustain growth. Latin America’s history also shows that such growth patterns are inherently fragile.

India Vulnerability and Structural Risks

Narrow tax bases limit counter-cyclical policies. High inequality constrains mass consumption. Credit expansion often substitutes for income growth, increasing financial vulnerability. India has thus far avoided repeated balance of payments or sovereign debt crises, but the underlying structural risks look similar to Latin America. Growth looks strong on paper, yet remains vulnerable to shocks and has been slow to translate into broad based societal gains.

India differs from economies that have escaped their inequality traps, like East Asia and Northern Europe, because of poor development sequencing. These successful regional giants expanded universal public education, healthcare, and social insurance early, before inequality became politically entrenched. Elite dependence on public systems sustained fiscal capacity and productivity diffusion, allowing growth to create gainful employment.

India’s Social and Economic Dualism

India’s economic liberalization grew before consolidating universal public provisions. As growth has accelerated, inequality has widened and the exit of elites has deepened from public centers. An opportunity to create inclusive institutions during this early growth phase is missing for parts of the society.

The implication is clear. High growth alone does not guarantee development. When inequality weakens public systems and limits fiscal capacity, this discourages technological risk taking and produces inadequate job growth. Output expansion becomes narrow and periodically fragile. Latin America’s experience is a warning. Without building strong public institutions and reshaping incentives toward broad based innovation, India risks portraying impressive headline growth while vast disparity persists.

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U.S National Security: USD Reserve Currency Importance

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U.S National Security: USD Reserve Currency Importance

Opinion: The following article is commentary and its views are solely those of the author. This article was first published the 23rd of December via The Angry Demagogue.

We would like to start going through the U.S administration’s National Security Strategy released last month. There is a lot in there – much of it the same as in past administrations and much of it different. The tone of course is full Trump and while the introductory parts try to make it into a revolutionary document it does in fact build upon much of what has been American foreign policy for decades. One thing it most certainly gets right is that American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has not found its compass. From a unitary world to one dependent upon global organizations, from a sharing of goals with western Europe to a pivot to Asia, from the war on terror and the middle east to Russia-Ukraine, the United States has struggled to find its way in the post-Cold War world.

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We however will concentrate today on one aspect of the strategy, the third bullet in part III – “What Are America’s Available Means to Get What We Want?”. The third bullet point speaks of America having “The world’s leading financial system and capital markets, including the Dollar’s global reserve currency status” – a point that no one with any knowledge of global capital markets can not accept. The end of the bullet point – the Dollar’s global reserve currency status – is the most important because it underscores America’s leadership and essentially allows the United States of America to finance its military and its welfare state. The U.S Dollar as the “reserve currency” means that nearly all the world’s goods are quoted and therefore sold in Dollars.

Why is that important to the United States? Because the U.S government depends on its ability to issue Treasury bonds and bills at will – something no other government can do. It can do this because for another country to buy oil or copper or titanium or corn or soybeans from a country that is not their own– they need access to Dollars. Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states quote the price of oil in U.S Dollars and demand payment in U.S Dollars. The Saudis can deposit those Dollars in American banks or in what is called Eurodollar deposits in foreign banks (there are some 13 trillion Dollars in Eurodollar accounts globally). The Eurodollar accounts are essentially promises by the bank to give U.S Dollars to the holder when he makes a withdrawal. This strengthens the U.S capital markets and allows investors to have better and more investment choices. It is not only America’s often superior companies that bring profits to 401k’s and pension funds but the liquidity and vastness of America’s capital markets that can list domestic and foreign corporations. The reserve currency leading to the advanced capital markets allows the world – and America – to do this.

The U.S Treasury market is so liquid because every country needs Dollars in order to trade. They need to have enough dollar reserves since no one actually wants their own currency. In Israel, for example, local gas companies cannot buy oil with Israeli Shekels, since what will Azerbaijan, for example, do with them? There are only so many products that Israel can sell them. They need Dollars so that they are free to buy other commodities or other products.

The U.S Dollar as a reserve currency also is a break on inflation since the price of oil and other commodities is always in U.S Dollars. A weak or strong U.S Dollar influences the inflation rate in non-USD countries. A weak Israeli Shekel, South African Rand or Chinese Yuan does not influence the price of gasoline in the United States.

In short – as the Trump Administration understands well, the dollar as a reserve currency is a luxury the U.S cannot give up. The lack of the USD as a reserve currency could cause the Dollar to collapse and along with it the price of U.S Treasuries. As UST prices drop, their yields will rise and the cost of financing the U.S government will make interest payments on debt to rise well beyond its already absurd figure of over 4% of GDP – while debt itself is 120% of GDP. The U.S government currently pays over $1 trillion in debt service (interest payments on its bonds and bills). By contrast, the U.S defense budget for 2024 was $836 billion (about 3.3% of GDP).

We need to ask ourselves what can challenge the USD as the reserve currency and what could happen that would encourage the world to change? While the E.U had dreams of making the Euro an alternative reserve currency, the lack of growth in the E.U’s economy and population have put that dream to rest. The only other country that could theoretically replace the United States as the global economic go to country could be China. While in the long run, China’s lack of openness would probably mean that the Yuan would not last long as the reserve currency, that does not mean that they couldn’t jolt the global economy just enough to force it to use the Yuan to buy oil and other commodities.

China is already cornering the market on rare earth minerals and it making inroads in Africa where it mines all sorts of commodities from gold to copper to platinum and so many others (Africa has about 30% of global mineral reserves). That in itself is not enough to rock the global markets and cause a change in how the world does business.

Oil though, is that one thing that could allow China to challenge the USD as the reserve currency, even if it just presents the Yuan as an alternative.

How could that happen?

A Chinese takeover of Taiwan, by whatever means it uses would give the Chinese Communist Party control not only of the South China Sea but also allow its noisier and inferior (to America’s) submarine fleet to enter the Pacific and patrol it freely. The Chinese Navy, with a base on the “other” side of Taiwan would give it control of the north-south sea lanes that Japan and South Korea are dependent upon. Essentially, Chinese control of Taiwan would put Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines at the mercy of the Chinese Navy. China could blockade these countries but that would be an act of war and then involve the navies of those countries and possibly the United States. It would affect the global economy negatively but it would not cause a change in world’s reserve currency. But, what if China works out a deal with Saudi Arabia to quote and sell their oil in Yuan (or the Chinese Petro-Yuan it wants to create) and then tells these countries, especially industrial powerhouses and energy poor Japan and South Korea that it will allow the passage of oil as long as they purchase the oil in Yuan?

Russia is already trying to get India to pay it for its oil in Yuan, to some success. Adding economies the size of Japan and South Korea would mean that any country that wants to buy oil could buy it in Yuan instead of Dollars. Once in Yuan, these countries would need to use the Yuan to buy Chinese products, deposit cash there and buy Chinese treasury bills. If China were to combine that with demands that all chips made in Taiwan also be sold in Yuan, the U.S Dollar would suddenly and forcefully no longer be the only reserve currency in the world.

Obviously, the way to stop this from happening is by stating outright that the United States will not tolerate a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. It is true, that the Strategy claims that the US “will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” but in practice the administration has criticized Japan’s tough talk on China instead of leaving it be. A strong silence on Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks on China would have served the purpose of keeping the status quo more than telling her to tone down her rhetoric. There is a strong “no intervention ever” strain in the country and the President must make the case that that is not an option if the United States wants to maintain its leadership position, way of life and general prosperity.

In short, the threat to the Dollar as the reserve currency heads right through Taiwan. For those who think that the investment the U.S makes in keeping the Dollar where it is, is too expensive, just think of going on vacation and having the change to Yuan before you leave the country, wondering how much to change because of currency fluctuation and how much fun it is to return with hundreds of dollars in banknotes that you can’t use. Imagine your credit card bill on such travels and wondering how you went 15% over budget but didn’t get anything extra for it. Now imagine the national economy working that way.

Disclaimer: the views expressed in this opinion article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily the opinions reflected by angrymetatraders.com or its associated parties.

You can follow Ira Slomowitz via The Angry Demagogue on Substack https://iraslomowitz.substack.com/ 

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India Insider: The 8.2% Growth Mirage Needs a Reality Check

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India Insider: The 8.2% Growth Mirage Needs a Reality Check

India is celebrating the 8.2% real GDP growth result for Q2 FY26, as if it has entered a new economic orbit. Politicians are claiming victory and media is packaging optimism. The narrative is simple: India cannot be stopped. But once we move beyond the headline, the number loses credibility. It rests on a broken deflator, a statistical gap that no one can trace, and data architecture that doesn’t consider half the economy. This is not a story of unstoppable growth. This is a story of statistical convenience.

The Production–Expenditure Divide

On the production side, the numbers look heroic. Manufacturing allegedly grew 9.1%, and financial and professional services posted more than 10% growth. Corporate India looks like it is flying. But when the same activity is measured from the expenditure side – who actually spends this income – the story weakens.

Private consumption at 7.9% is respectable, not outstanding. The real shock is government consumption, which contracted by 2.7%. A shrinking government should normally mute growth, not accelerate it. Yet the GDP shoots up. How does that make sense? It doesn’t unless the number is being propped up somewhere else – and this is the case.

₹1.63 Lakh Crore of ‘Unknown Growth’

GDP includes a category called ‘discrepancy’. It exists because the two methods – production and expenditure – never perfectly align. The discrepancy stands at ₹1.63 lakh crore ($18.2 Billion USD) which equates into roughly 3.3% of real GDP. That means a chunk of this 8.2% growth has no identifiable spender: No households. No firms. No government.

It is income without absorption. A statistical plug. When a number this large is called ‘discrepancy’, the headline becomes unreliable – suspicious. You cannot claim world beating growth when your own data admits it cannot explain where that growth came from.

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Chart via the National Statistical Office

The Deflator Illusion

The next distortion is the nominal vs real GDP gap. Nominal GDP is growing at 8.7% and real GDP at 8.2%. A gap of 0.5 percentage points implies inflation has almost vanished. Every Indian knows this is not true. Costs did not collapse. Food inflation has not disappeared.

The explanation is mechanical: India still uses the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) to deflate nominal output. Global commodity prices fell, WPI softened sharply, and that flattening pushed up the real number. In other words, GDP grew because the denominator fell, not because production surged.

This creates a fiscal problem. The Union Budget assumed 10.1% nominal growth. At 8.7%, tax buoyancy will weaken, deficit targets become more difficult, and next year’s fiscal capability shrinks. Real GDP does not pay the bills, Nominal GDP does.

The Informal Blind Spot

India still cannot measure its informal economy accurately. Nearly half of GDP and employment sits outside the formal system, yet the NSO uses formal sector proxies such as corporate balance sheets, GST data, and financial flows to estimate the rest of the economy. If a small business collapses and a corporate giant expands, the data shows a net gain, erasing distress at the bottom which means real economic circumstances are not portrayed accurately for Indian citizens.

Agriculture grew at 3.5%, but it still supports 46% of India’s workforce. That means growth is concentrated in capital intensive and balance-sheet heavy sectors, not into areas that put cash into rural hands. A booming Nifty Index via the stock market does not translate into household prosperity.

An Economy Measured with Old Tools

India continues to measure GDP using a 2011–12 base year, an era before UPI (Unified Payments Interface), before fintech credit, before e-commerce, before gig workforces, before the pandemic rewired supply chains and consumption patterns. India is living in a digital economy, but measuring activity with analog instruments.

A shift to a 2022–23 base year, plus replacing WPI with a Producer Price Index, may finally align the numbers realistically. But until then, headlines are running ahead of bona-fide measurements.

India’s 8.2% print is impressive, but growth estimates that don’t reflect grounded realities produce illusionary optics rather than useful insights. For India to strengthen fiscal and economic credibility, measurements must capture households, labor markets, and productivity, not solely corporate outputs. Policy cannot be shaped by statistical ambiguity, it requires transparency and trusted data.

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India Insider: Why a Deep Corporate Bond Market is Needed

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India Insider: Why a Deep Corporate Bond Market is Needed

India’s corporate bond market remains small relative to the size and ambitions of its economy. This is often described as a regulatory shortcoming. In reality, it reflects a deeper structural choice: India’s financial system was built to channel savings through banks, not markets. That choice now imposes visible constraints on capital formation, governance, and risk pricing.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, several Indian companies including firms such as Arvind Fashions were forced to raise capital by diluting their equity in public markets. Equity issuance is not inherently wrong, especially during a crisis. However, businesses built on consumer brands, distribution networks, and long gestation cycles require patient, long term capital. Financing such models primarily through short term bank loans or repeated equity dilution creates a mismatch between the nature of the business and the nature of the capital supporting it.

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India Corporate Bond Comparison to the U.S 2024-25 Approximated Totals

In countries like the U.S, this gap is filled by intermediate forms of capital. Private equity firms often provide long duration funding through instruments such as mezzanine debt, while deep corporate bond markets allow companies to raise long term money aligned with their operating horizons. In India, the absence of such markets make corporate choose to either raise capital via short term debt that strains cash flows or equity dilution at unfavorable points in the cycle.

A corporate bond market also serves a broader purpose: governance and accountability. A Parliamentary Standing Committee report in 2022 noted that nearly ₹10 lakh crore ($110 Billion USD) of corporate bank loans were written off over the preceding five years. While write-offs do not automatically imply wrongdoing, they highlight a system in which credit losses are repeatedly absorbed by public sector balance sheets where the capital is often infused by taxpayers money. In bank dominated systems, credit assessment is periodic and opaque. Market discipline remains weak.

Traded securities impose a different standard. Michael Milken once observed that bond markets re-evaluate credit daily, not every six months. Prices respond immediately to new information. If sellers suddenly outnumber buyers, the market forces a reassessment of risk in real time. In effect, every trading day becomes a fresh credit decision.

This discipline is missing when loans remain locked within banks. A vibrant corporate bond market which is supported by securitization, secondary-market liquidity, and institutional investors would allow credit risk to be priced, transferred, and monitored continuously. It would expose stress early, rather than after losses have already been socialized.

Today, banks account for nearly 70 percent of financial intermediation in India. Fintech has begun to challenge this dominance, but largely in consumer and personal finance. For corporate and MSME (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises) financing, long-term capital cannot come from apps or short duration loans, it must come from markets designed to price risk over time.

India’s corporate bond market will not look like America’s, nor does it need to. But without deeper liquidity, institutional participation, and price discovery, India will continue to build long term businesses on short-term money ,and bear the consequences when cycles turn.

(Notes: 1 USD = 90.58)

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India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

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India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

As Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi for a bilateral summit, the mood in India’s capital is one of profound strategic tension. The core of the problem is India’s massive appetite for discounted Russian Crude Oil, which has shielded the economy from high energy prices but is now causing significant financial and geopolitical risks. This move comes at a time when India’s most important trade surpluses lies with the West, raising anxieties about U.S sanctions and shrinking strategic space.

Trapped Rupee Problem

Since the Ukraine war, Russia’s share of India’s Crude Oil imports has surged from under 2% to nearly 40%. This has simultaneously inflated India’s trade deficit with Russia to nearly $59 billion.

The transactions are largely settled in Indian Rupees (INR). Moscow has accumulated billions of Rupees in Indian banks. However, because the Rupee is not fully convertible on the global market, Russia has very limited ways to use this huge surplus within India. These billions of Rupees are essentially ‘trapped liquidity’ – a problem neither country can easily solve.

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India – Russia Bilateral Merchandise Trade Chart from 2017 – 2024

The Kremlin, meanwhile, is shifting its financial allegiance. It is preparing to issue Yuan denominated sovereign bonds, a decisive step that deepens its reliance on Beijing’s financial system amid a cut off from the Western financial system. This financial trajectory clearly signals the next logical step: Russia will inevitably demand that India begin paying for its oil shipments in Chinese Yuan (CNY).

Structural Risk of Holding Chinese Yuan

India has never been comfortable holding Chinese Yuan or settling trades in the currency. That’s partly strategic as New Delhi wants to protect its geopolitical autonomy and position itself as the democratic anchor of the Global South while staying closely aligned with the West.

But Russia’s financial plumbing is now increasingly routed through China. As the Kremlin becomes more deeply integrated into China’s banking and payments system, its dependence on the Yuan becomes structural. Moscow needs Yuan not only to service Chinese creditors, but also to pay for its expanding list of manufactured imports from China. The Ruble, being a largely non-convertible currency, simply cannot support this scale of trade.

For now, Russia-China trade is balanced enough because Beijing still buys large quantities of Russian energy. But this equilibrium can shift quickly. As the Ukraine war drags on and Moscow’s defense spending rises, the Kremlin will be forced to rely even more heavily on Chinese financing, Chinese goods, and ultimately the Yuan itself, tightening its economic dependency on Beijing.

When that moment arrives, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will be forced to accumulate Yuan as part of its Forex reserves to ensure the continued flow of oil. This decision, born of necessity, introduces a structural vulnerability into India’s financial system as the adoption of Yuan as a reserve currency subject to China’s capital controls.

Risks of Holding the Yuan

China may have both the onshore (CNY) and offshore (CNH) Yuan, but the currency is ultimately controlled by the PBOC, which makes it a risky reserve asset for India. In a crisis, Beijing’s capital controls could restrict liquidity and prevent the RBI from freely converting yuan into hard currency like the USD, effectively trapping India’s capital.

Beyond this financial rigidity, large Yuan holdings also expose India to CCP driven political risk, tying its external stability to China’s domestic decisions. And unlike the Dollar which can be deployed anywhere, Yuan reserves are usable mainly for transactions with China or countries in its financial orbit, sharply limiting India’s strategic and financial flexibility.

Strategic Win for Beijing

For Beijing, this shift delivers a double strategic win, cementing the Yuan as the dominant settlement currency across Eurasia especially among countries squeezed by Western sanctions and it allows the yuan to slip into India’s financial system indirectly, not through Chinese pressure but through Russia’s growing dependence on Chinese finance and India’s reliance on discounted Russian oil.

For Moscow, this is a reluctant compromise: giving up some monetary autonomy in exchange for necessary financial support from China.

For India, however, it introduces a new long term structural risk with a slow but steady Yuan encroachment into its trade and reserve system, operating alongside the dominant U.S Dollar. The oil corridor that was meant to offer an independent strategic opportunity for India is now becoming a channel which Beijing can strengthen its monetary footprint. In this complex triangle, India risks paying a dangerous tactical long-term price for its energy security.

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India Insider: Nifty Defense Index Surges in 2025 Rearmament

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India Insider: Nifty Defense Index Surges in 2025 Rearmament

2025 has marked a defining moment for defense equities, both globally and in India. The Nifty India Defence (Defense) Index, which tracks the country’s leading defense manufacturers, has surged sharply on the back of robust order flows, a structural policy shift, and increasingly volatile geopolitical conditions. This rise is not an isolated event but part of a broader global rearmament cycle that is reshaping the defense industrial landscape.

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Nifty India Defence (Defense) Index One Year Chart as of 20th November 2025

India’s defense sector has been one of the standout performers in the domestic equity market. By mid-2025, the Nifty Defense Index had risen more than 25% year to date, outperforming most sectoral indices. This rally is primarily anchored in strong capital expenditure by the Government of India, which continues to accelerate indigenous military modernization. The Defense Ministry’s approvals which is running into tens of thousands of crores have expanded visibility for companies such as HAL, Bharat Electronics, Bharat Dynamics, and shipbuilding PSUs (Public Sector Undertakings). For investors, the nature of long durations within defense order books has provided earnings stability at a time when other manufacturing sectors have been grappling with cyclical softness.

The second driver has been a multi-year strategic shift toward import substitution. India’s reliance on foreign weapons systems has long strained its current accounts and created operational vulnerabilities. However, the ongoing indigenization push, reinforced by Production Linked Incentive schemes, procurement embargoes on foreign systems, and export incentives, has fundamentally realigned the sector. Defense exports have crossed record levels, and Indian firms are increasingly integrated into global supply chains for electronics, avionics, and ammunition.

Global Industrial Defense Rebirth

But the domestic story is tightly interconnected with developments abroad. The global defense market is undergoing its most significant expansion since the post 9/11 decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Red Sea shipping crisis, conflict in the Middle East, and a renewed great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific have pushed countries to reassess defense readiness. NATO’s decision in 2025 to raise defense spending targets from 2% of GDP to 5% by 2035 has far reaching implications. This commitment translates into trillions of dollars in additional defense outlays over the coming decade, making Europe one of the fastest-growing defense markets.

Companies such as Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman are already reporting record order inflows. Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest defense company, expects its revenues to quintuple by 2030, reflecting unprecedented demand for advanced artillery, ammunition, and combat vehicles. The United States, meanwhile, continues to channel significant funding into hypersonic, missile defense, and drone systems as competition with China intensifies.

India’s Edge in Rearmaments and Technology

This global rearmament wave has a direct spillover effect on India. International supply chain shortages particularly for semiconductors, propulsion systems, and munitions have created opportunities for Indian firms to plug capability gaps. With a cheaper cost base and growing technological sophistication, Indian defense manufacturers are emerging as viable exporters in segments such as UAVs, naval platforms, and electronic warfare systems.

In this environment, the rally in the Nifty Defense Index is not merely speculative exuberance, but a significant reflection of structural and synchronized global demand. As defense has evolved from a low beta sector to a strategic growth industry, India’s integration into the global defense economy positions its companies for sustained earnings expansion over the next decade.

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India Insider: The Need for Quality Jobs and Improved Safety

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India Insider: The Need for Quality Jobs and Improved Safety

Recent data released from the Ministry of Labor Statistics depicts a worrying aspect of India’s labor market. Every second urban young woman in Bihar and Rajasthan is unemployed. Nationally, one in four young women remains without work. This reflects deep structural issues in India’s workforce and the job market’s inability to provide high-quality employment.

Industries in urban India are not generating enough decent jobs to absorb educated youth, especially women. Even when jobs exist, they are often of poor quality, lacking social safety standards and sometimes damaging workers’ health and well being.

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Via the National Statistics Office of India Unemployment Data

A recent piece in The Diplomat, a magazine covering the Asia-Pacific region with current affairs, highlighted how workers trade off their health and welfare well-being for the opportunity of precarious living. If an economist like Robert Gordon, who wrote “The Rise and Fall of American Growth“, were to look at their lives, it would remind him of the 19th-century United States.

Migrant workers from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh toil in textile recycling plants under hazardous conditions for just ₹5,000 ($58.00) a month. Women form a significant share of this workforce, often assigned trivial tasks in unsafe factories. Many have developed asthma and tuberculosis after prolonged exposure to dust and poor ventilation.

The Rise of the Informal Sector

Formal workers generate an annual GVA (Gross Value Added) of ₹12 lakh, while informal workers produce just ₹1.4 lakh, according to the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (ASUSE) 2022–23.

Neoclassical economics says wages reflect a worker’s productivity. But this logic collapses in economies like India’s, where a vast army like reserve of labor, keeps wages low – even when productivity rises.

Excess labor supply depresses pay across sectors, from private school teachers to gig workers. Many gig workers spend long hours to earn a modest income, without access to provident funds, health insurance, or paid leave. This precarity extends from India to the United States and Indonesia.

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Statistics via Kuntala Karkun & Samriddhi Prakash, Pahle India Foundation

The Gap Between Law and Reality

India has strong labor codes, streamlined in 2020, yet they remain largely unenforced. Companies often ignore them due to cost pressures, effective lobbying, or weak state monitoring.

Economic growth without wage growth widens inequality and breeds social tension. For growth to be inclusive, wages must rise with GDP.

This demands more than redistribution. It requires the transformation of raising workers’ productivity, ensuring labor rights, and giving every worker their fair share of India’s prosperity.

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India Insider: Reserve Bank of India Intervention is Limited

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India Insider: Reserve Bank of India Intervention is Limited

After weeks of steady appreciation due to Reserve Bank of India intervention on the 15th of October, the Indian Rupee has now returned to the same 88.72 levels against the USD before the policy action was enacted. The RBI’s recent offensive against speculators may have calmed the market temporarily, but it reflects a reactionary and short-term approach to deeper structural pressures facing India’s external administrative policies regarding the USD/INR.

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USD/INR Three Month Chart as of 5th November 2025

Despite the Reserve Bank of India’s efforts to influence the cash forward market, where Dollar shorts rose by 6 billion USD in September to $59 billion, fundamentals suggest that Rupee weakness is not purely speculative. It is a rational market adjustment due to rising trade barriers amid U.S tariffs on India’s merchandise exports. The added uncertainty regarding trade caused the Rupee to naturally absorb external shocks. Merchandise exports to the U.S fell 12% in September year on year, according to official India data, prompting some calls for government relief.

India’s Foreign Remittances & H1-B Visa Fee Hike

According to World Bank data, India received about 137.7 billion USD in personal remittances from abroad in 2024. From that amount, around $40 billion is coming from the United States. The Trump administration raised the cost of H1-B visa fees from below 10,000 USD to nearly $100,000. And there is now also an increased likelihood of measures aimed at limiting digitally delivered software services to the U.S from India. These combined measures would substantially reduce Dollar receipts via exports of technology driven software and IT services, as well as remittances from a reduction of workers on temporary U.S visas providing on site services to U.S clients. USD inflow has been crucial for India’s balance of payment’s stability.

Reduction of USD reserves when the trade deficit is already rising because of hikes caused by tariffs on India’s exports would widen the current account deficit. Concerns about a decrease in remittances leading to a potentially significant decline of India’s USD reserve ability is possibly discouraging the India Reserve Bank to voluntarily expend reserves to support the Rupee.

Service Exports Cushion India’s Balance of Payments:

India’s total service exports touched 400 Billion USD over the past year with a predominant amount coming from the U.S. In other words, India has had a $202 billion in services trade surplus over the last 12 months, which covered almost 114% of India’s merchandise trade deficit in 2024-25.

India’s goods trade deficit is matched by a services surplus, plus net foreign personal remittances. This USD equation is under threat because of prolonged paralysis from stubborn US and India trade negotiations debating Russian Oil usage and the U.S demand to allow agricultural products into India.

Foreign Investors Selling Indian Equities

In addition, the Indian Rupee is not getting support from investment portfolio inflows. A shortfall of AI related avenues in the nation’s tech sector, and perhaps because of valuations considered too rich, foreign Investors have pulled 17 billion USD so far this year. This sum is more than any other emerging market, which is eating away at the Reserve Bank of India’s FX reserves too.

Global and India-specific uncertainties spurred by the Trump administration’s actions are setting off a retreat of footloose portfolio capital invested into India’s equity and bond markets. If the Reserve Bank of India was confident that inflows of foreign capital would replenish reserves it would likely help the Indian Rupee, and thus investor confidence coming from abroad.

Policy Irony and the Limits of Intervention

The U.S. remains India’s largest export market, but new levies of 50% tariffs are hurting labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, leather, footwear, and gems & jewelry.

While concerns about imported inflation are valid, the benefits of a weaker Rupee should not be overlooked. A mild depreciation could boost India’s service exports, improve the balance of payments, and partly offset the effects of U.S. tariffs on merchandise exports.

A material improvement in U.S and India trade relations is needed. Until a restoration is achieved in relations and a merchandise surplus is possible, alongside healthy services and remittance inflows occurring again, the Rupee’s weakness is likely to persist. In the meantime, Reserve Bank of India interventions could prove to be a short term tactic that proves vulnerable mid-term to the influence of market forces known and unexpected.

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India Insider: Affluence Among the Few, Aspirations for Many

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India Insider: Affluence Among the Few, Aspirations for Many

A recent report by Franklin Templeton highlighted that India’s per capita income will penetrate the $5,000.00 USD level by 2031, pushing the country into what some analysts consider an affluence trigger zone. Their article celebrates the consumer boom showing the rising sales of premium detergents, growing green tea consumption, and a surge in discretionary spending, as if prosperity has finally crossed over into a mainstream phenomena.

But a closer look reveals something else and a worthwhile critique of Franklin Templeton’s optimistic portrayal.

Who Actually Spends this Money ?

The Franklin Templeton report confidently attributes the wealth effect to rising equities, real estate and gold. Yet, with only 13 crore (130 million) demat accounts in a country of 143 crore people, how can equities be driving broad affluence? Even within those attributed accounts, activity is heavily concentrated in the top decile of income earners like urban professionals in finance, IT and export linked sectors; and over 70% of mutual fund assets under management come from the top ten cities.

The so called upper middle class that fuels premium consumption largely works in these sectors. For the rest of India – especially the 42% still dependent on agriculture – wages have barely kept pace with inflation. Several national surveys and analyses show real wage stagnation since 2015-2016. Data from the Labor Bureau and the National Sample Survey (NSSO) indicates that real wages for rural laborers had near zero growth between 2015-2016 and 2022-2023. In contrast, the period before 2015-16 showed much faster wage growth.

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NSSO Survey data compiled by Idea India Magazine

The Concentration of Savings and Spending Power

The report itself concedes that the top 20% of households hold around 85% of India’s total savings. That’s roughly 26 crore people (260 million) driving most of the premium consumption, while the remaining 104 crore (1.04 billion) share only 15% of savings – a stark reminder that aggregate growth often hides skewed realities. And this is why rural households and lower-income urban families, meanwhile, are facing tighter budgets and are actually cutting back on discretionary spending.

Gold as a Survival Cushion

The report romanticizes gold as a symbol of wealth, but in rural India, the precious metal plays a very different role. Gold is not an indicator of luxury and status, but a financial safety net. In villages around Tiruvannamalai City of Tamil Nadu State. Where I have surveyed about 50 families, average holdings are often below 40 grams. When harvests fail or cash flows tighten, this gold is pledged or sold to fund essentials like health expenses, education or seeds for the next planting season.

Yes, some towns in India have higher gold holdings and savings, sharply due to offshore remittances especially in States like Kerala and Gujarat. This remittance led prosperity fuels local real estate and pushes up rents, but it’s a localized story, not a national one. Most rural communities still depend on seasonal income and informal borrowing.

The Uneven Reality Behind Growth

Premium brands are growing faster, but this signals income polarization, not inclusive growth. The per capita income maybe rising, but it’s an average skewed by the top 10-20% who hold multiple assets. For most, consumption is fueled by rising debt. Until wage growth broadens and rural incomes strengthen, India’s  consumption boom will remain the affluence of a few – not the prosperity of the many.