India GDP Savings 20260911

India Insider: Leveraged FCNR Deposits Reliance and Remittances Masks Structural Vulnerabilities

by with No Comment AssetsBehavioral SentimentBen EzraCentral BanksEconomyExclusive ContentFeatured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsForexIndiaInvestingSpeculatorsUncategorizedWorld

Forging True External Strength Without Relying on the Crutch of Foreign Deposits

For the last few weeks, financial publications have applauded the news that India received around $127 billion USD via leveraged foreign NRI deposits (FCNR). Banks swapped these dollars for Rupees with the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), securing cheap funding while ostensibly strengthening India’s external position. Analysts have calculated that while the hedging cost for the RBI is around $16.3 billion USD, the investment income generated by parking those funds in U.S Treasuries could reach $22.4 billion USD. On a net basis, this implies a $6.1 billion USD gain for the RBI over the next five years. However, while this may look like a tactical victory on a balance sheet, it ignores a fundamental macroeconomic contradiction: if the Indian economy is growing robustly, why isn’t its external position strengthening organically?

The Remittance Paradox

Indian rural towns and villages have long sent workers abroad to Singapore, Malaysia, the Gulf States and beyond. This migration has created a flush of dollar remittances, making India the world’s largest recipient in absolute terms. For instance, India has attracted around $135 billion USD in 2025, a figure that has been rising steadily. Yet, despite this massive nominal volume, remittances represent only about 3.6% of total GDP. 

This capital undeniably boosts domestic consumption, but it also exposes a structural gap between wages inside India and abroad. The fundamental characteristics of current account deficit countries is that they demonstrate low domestic savings, high investment needs, and persistent reliance on foreign capital to finance their deficits.

India GDP Savings 20260911

World Bank/CEIC for India and Global Average, and Wiemer EAI Brief for China’s 2008 Peak

In India’s case if the economy were truly expanding from within as said, domestic incomes would have risen proportionally with national growth, expanding the pool of internal capital. Instead with a vastly informal economy, India remains heavily dependent on its diaspora to fund its current account deficit.

The Domestic Savings Deficit

According to periodic labor force surveys, India is projected to have a working age population of around 900 million by 2030. To effectively employ this massive demographic dividend, the country urgently needs to raise its domestic savings rate. Currently clinging to roughly 31% of GDP, India lags far behind industrial powerhouses like China, which leveraged a domestic savings rate of around 45% to fuel its manufacturing ascent.

Policymakers should not rejoice over a capital account surplus funded by NRIs, especially when that surplus is leveraged over 7 to 10 times. It is this exact diaspora sending USD home that fuels India’s consumption, creating an illusion of self sustaining economic liftoff.

The “Dutch Disease” in Local Economies

The heavy reliance on remittances creates severe geographical distortions. Many towns possess high savings but they are incredibly unevenly distributed. These high savings are attributed to external capital rather than domestic productivity, while local employment remains trapped in informal service sectors or low productivity agriculture. Towns with high foreign remittances naturally develop immense asset bubbles in real estate and experience soaring rent and consumption costs. Because these economies do not export goods or services to other states or countries via production or services, they rely entirely on external capital inflows to generate internal demand. This reflects a localized variant of the “Dutch Disease”.

The labor market is extremely tight in these areas. Due to the high cost of living and limited wage growth, workers tend to migrate to other regions or overseas in search of better opportunities. This tight market further contributes to cost inflation in labor, food, and overall living expenses and increasing the cost structure for both households and businesses. This vicious cycle is primarily due to weak policy decisions from the government’s end, such as inadequate industrial infrastructure, poor urban planning, weak skills development, limited MSME financing, also insufficient connectivity.

A Structural Transformation is Required

This economic pattern is not unique to India, it also mirrors provincial towns in the Philippines, regions in Mexico and parts of the Balkans. While remittances support consumption and keep real estate elevated, they fail to translate into productive investment due to weak industrial bases and limited economic linkages. The result is seen vividly in the balance of payments clearly as India’s importing needs keep increasing, but the inability of Indian goods to compete globally results in persistent gaps in export volumes. 

With protectionist rhetoric vibrating in Washington and anti immigration protests rising from the U.S to Australia, this model is highly vulnerable. The Indian government must urgently pivot toward policies that empower Indian nationals to work in small and medium scale businesses (SMEs) domestically. By focusing on small scale manufacturing with high economic linkages and wage growth potential, domestic savings will naturally rise, eventually forging true external strength without relying on the crutch of foreign deposits.

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Indian Rupee 20260826

India Insider: Rupee’s Prolonged Weakness Remains Unresolved

by with No Comment Behavioral SentimentBen EzraCentral BanksCommoditiesEconomyExclusive ContentFeatured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsForexIndiaInvestingSpeculatorsUncategorizedWorld

Better Streamlined Government Policy Needed for the Rupee

In July of this year Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra talked to Business Line magazine and argued that recent Rupee depreciation does not reflect any weakness in the country’s economic fundamentals. According to him, pressure on the currency has largely stemmed from geopolitical tensions, USD strength  and broader volatility across emerging markets.

However, the USD which strengthened during the outset of the US-Iran war has been losing value in large chunks in the broad Forex market the past month. The U.S Federal Reserve remains neutral regarding its interest rate guidance and U.S labor market data has emerged weaker. On top of that, the U.S Treasury’s decision to intervene in U.S long-term bonds via buybacks in order to cool yields has hastened another USD path lower, while igniting buying in many other currencies and gold.

Indian Rupee 20260826

USD/INR Five Year Chart as of 26 August 2026

Despite the Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Bank) deposits coming from overseas investors increasing, which are leveraged products structured by banks and helped to attract more than $50 Billion USD since June, the Rupee’s reaction to this set of recent inflows has been muted. The Indian Rupee is traversing near 95.55 levels as of this writing, notably as other Asian currencies like Korean Won and Singapore Dollar are trading at stronger levels.

India’s Forex reserves climbed to $716.9 billion boosted by these inflows, along with USD related external borrowings by corporate and commercial banks. Nevertheless, the fundamental problems for the Rupee’s prolonged weakness remains unresolved.

Reasons for Rupee’s Weakness Structurally

The Indian Rupee has depreciated around 28% against USD since 2022. Irrespective of this, the merchandise tradable exports have been stagnant, rising a mere 5.7% – from $417 billion to $441.8 billion USD. While on the other hand, merchandise imports have risen 26% from $610 billion to $774.80 billion USD in the period between 2021-2025.

However, India’s balance of payments is not at immediate risk, because even as higher importing needs (especially with Crude Oil and LNG) and lower tradable exports, the total merchandise deficit of around $350 billion USD as of 2025 is being offset by healthy IT exports and foreign remittances.

The fundamental question is why hasn’t the Indian Rupee depreciation expanded merchandise exports in the last few years? As Carlos Dias Alejandro depicts in his seminal work Exchange-rates Devaluations in a Semi-industrialized Country: The Experience of Argentina 1955-1961, throughout Argentina’s history rural producers who supplied most of the exported commodities traditionally advocated a policy of devaluation.

Argentine exporters expected Peso prices for their outputs to rise faster than the Peso prices for their imports, including the wages that they paid for their employees in current prices. In other words, exporters stand to gain from a currency devaluation because it can make their products more competitive in global markets and encourage resources to move towards export production.

Argentina’s experience after Juan Peron who was overthrown in 1955 provides an important context to this argument. The economic policies pursued during the Peron years had already left Argentina with serious inflation , weak agricultural incentives, low investment and balance of payments pressures. The devaluation and stabilization policies that followed were therefore part of a broader attempt to correct the distortions that had built up during the previous period.

Interestingly, the Rupee depreciation has so far not shifted resources from producing goods for foreign products as it is apparently clear via merchandise trade data. The IT sector has been one of the few sectors that has been able to use this shift positively.

It is also important to understand that devaluation does not produce only positive outcomes. A devaluation that increases the overall level of prices can cause a redistribution of income among different social groups, in much the same way as inflation does in a closed economy. Unwieldy redistribution becomes inevitable when the prices of outputs and inputs do not change proportionally.

For instance, wages are central to this process. If prices of food, fuel and other essential goods rise quickly after a devaluation, but nominal wages adjust slowly, workers experience a decline in real wages and purchasing power. Their incomes may remain unchanged in Rupee terms, yet they can afford fewer goods and services. This effectively transfers income from wage earners to firms and producers whose prices or profits adjust more rapidly.

The impact can also differ across workers. Employees in organized sectors may negotiate higher wages or receive inflation linked adjustments, while informal workers, agricultural laborers and those dependent on fixed incomes often have less bargaining power and face a sharper fall in real earnings. At the same time, exporters may benefit if the prices of their products rise faster than their wage and other input costs.

However, if workers eventually demand compensation for the higher cost of living, wage increases can raise production costs and reduce part of the initial competitiveness gained through devaluation. Thus the effect of devaluation depends not only on the exchange rate, bit also on how quickly wages, prices and productivity respond.

In that sense, Argentina’s experience in the 1950s offers a warning for semi industrialized countries like India. A devaluation of the Rupee can make some exports competitive, but it cannot create more productive capacity on its own. Without addressing deeper structural problems, a weaker currency can instead push up prices and reduce households real purchasing power.

Rupee Effects Absorbed and Felt by Those Who Earn Low Wages

Prices of goods and services have increased in the last few years due to the depreciation of the Rupee, especially for imported goods. Since India not only imports oil and gas for consumption, but also imports machinery and intermediate goods for production it has forced households to spend a higher share of their income on the consumption of needed goods.

When households do not earn they need to borrow or hope that their wages increase. In India real wages don’t always go up with inflation. This is due to India having a higher supply of available labor which makes negotiating for higher wages difficult for workers. If employers can find another worker relatively easily as a replacement, the employed worker has limited power.

The ILO (International Labor Organization) notes that India remains characterized by extensive informality and low pay employment, it also estimates that 62 million workers earn below the minimum wage. India’s workers are not necessarily competing in the global market. Manufacturing as a percent of GDP has stayed around 15% over a decade. And irrespective of the fact that India is a major agricultural producer and exporting nation and over 46% of its labor force engages in the sector, total Agri-Exports stayed within a band of $48-$53 billion for the last few years.

The government says that India is growing because services as a percent of GDP is 55%, but the nation employs around one-third of the labor force in the informal economy. While IT employees earn higher wages comparatively because their wages are connected with global demand and have an advantage because they are export services, those who work in construction, domestic help, shops, agriculture and the service sector are earning substantially less. The wages of these people won’t go up until changes are made. 

The vast numbers and informality of employment within a significant amount of India’s labor force prevents low wage costs from translating into solid competitiveness, particularly as inflation is seen and depreciation of the INR continues. Economies like China, Vietnam and Korea have created industrial strength by transferring household savings through lower costs for goods and subsidizing businesses.

India’s decade long reluctance to invest in necessary infrastructure, not preventing or fixing regulatory problems, a lack of commitment to invest in skill based education, and not creating conditions for businesses to compete with overseas markets have created conditions that result in low consumption and low wages. The devaluation of the INR hits households who are acting as shock absorbers in the absence of streamlined government policy.

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Indian Rupee 20260729

India Insider: Real Story Behind the Rupee’s Weakness

by with No Comment Behavioral SentimentBen EzraCentral BanksEconomyExclusive ContentFeatured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsIndiaInvestingSpeculatorsUncategorizedWorld

Change of Policy Could Create a Stronger INR

RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra says, Rupee depreciation doesn’t reflect weaknesses in the underlying economy. He says that the external factors due to geopolitical tensions induced by oil prices rising has created a Dollar demand and created Rupee weakness. 

While it’s true the Rupee has depreciated because of foreign capital fleeing and oil importers’ persistent demand for USD when buying oil and gas, this doesn’t answer the entire issue regarding INR vulnerability.

Questions surrounding the Rupee’s weakness should also focus on fundamental causes for depreciation. For instance, the Rupee has largely depreciated the past 5 years from 2021 – from 74.50 per Dollar – and into 2026, where its trading around 95.72 per the USD/INR now. Why?

Indian Rupee 20260729

USD/INR Five Year Chart as of 29 July 2026

Nominal depreciation has been 28%, and this is despite service exports growing healthier, and remittances flows that have been good in the last few years. Can the RBI governor say anything related to it?

Why Does the Rupee Remain Weak?

Economists point to the widening gap between India’s foreign inflows and outflows as a structural flaw that’s weighed on the Rupee and growth. A reason for this is India’s struggle to attract long-term capital through Foreign Direct Investment. Net FDI has declined from $28 billion in 2022-23 year to just $7.7 billion in the financial year that ended in March.

Foreign multinationals, venture capitalists and private equity titans have been taking advantage of high valuations to cash out. Despite recent pro-business reforms by Narendra Modi’s government, India’s shabby infrastructure and a bureaucracy that reduces Byzantium schemes to shame, puts off new arrivals. This is also a reason why tradable exports are not growing compared to India’s vast import needs. India’s exchange rate remains relatively overvalued, even though in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, Indian products are inexpensive compared with those of the United States.

India could have allowed the Rupee to reflect it’s underlying market fundamentals in order to make it’s exports more competitive and restore external balance. Given the high supply of skilled India’s labor force and opportunities in small and medium scale businesses, especially in agricultural value added products where India holds competitive advantages, it’s not impossible to improve tradable export volumes. Instead, the Reserve Bank of India went in the opposite direction by managing the Rupee at 83/USD and made it overvalued, especially when Shaktikanda Das was the Governor of RBI.

If the RBI truly believes in India’s economic fundamentals story, then why did it intervene aggressively during the 2023-2024 period? Critics argued these known interventions may also have had the effect of supporting India’s GDP when measured in USD, although the RBI maintains that its objective was to reduce excessive volatility and preserve financial stability.

Even with respect to headline GDP growth numbers, many economists in India and around the world still believe that Indian statistical numbers overstate the actual strength of the underlying economy. To generate better growth data in India, the government has expanded it capital expenditures to compensate against relatively weak private investment. However, creating jobs and opportunities for linkages – opportunities in sector related industries, and enhancing India’s trade competitiveness via high value exports are important and urgent, rather than depending on foreign capital flows. In this regard, private capital expenditures still need to increase substantially.

Relying on short term capital flows for managing the current account deficit is a difficult strategy. Even if the RBI believes a de-escalation in the US and Iran War will occur, and believes that global liquidity conditions will allow the RBI to accumulate higher Forex reserves, risks remain skewed negatively to the upside without meaningful changes to improve long-term net Foreign Direct Investment.

David Lubin of Chatham House argues that countries should not rely only on high Forex reserves to protect themselves from volatile capital flows. The best strategy in his view is to reduce the potential problems at its source by discouraging unstable, short term inflows, and ensuring banks do not accumulate excessive foreign currency risks.

However, this is exactly what India is doing by mobilizing leveraged foreign currency deposits from non-resident Indian’s and offering hedging for these inflows until September 2026. Reserve Bank of India Governor Malhotra has stated that the RBI has attracted around $32 billion worth of USD inflows via this route.

Arguably, another side of the equation should be examined. If central banks were to accumulate FX reserves for the sake of paying for their imports, without meaningful reforms in their own economy and not creating conditions for capital to be deposited long-term, no capital controls can ably solve the underlying deficits or surplus nature for those respective economies.

In India capital account surplus has created deficits because the net Foreign Direct Investment has been weak resulting in funding costs for transactions in current accounts to increase. Apparently, this dilemma goes beyond the RBI balance sheet capabilities and exposes flaws in the fundamental reality of economic internal policies. The ensuing crisis hits the Rupee faster as capital leaves and damages the exchange rate.

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Indian Rupee 20260611

India Insider: Should the RBI Raise Interest Rates?

by with No Comment AssetsBehavioral SentimentBen EzraCentral BanksExclusive ContentFeatured HighlightsForexIndiaRisk ManagementUncategorizedWorld

A Case for Higher Interest Rates In India

As the Rupee remains under pressure and oil prices continue to rise amid tensions in the Middle East, the debate has shifted towards what the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) should do next.

Economist Janak Raj has argued that raising interest rates to defend the Rupee comes with significant costs. Higher rates increase the cost of capital for businesses, reduce investment activity, and compress equity valuations. In theory, this could even accelerate foreign outflows from equities rather than attract fresh capital. Yet the RBI may soon find itself with limited options.

Indian Rupee 20260611

USD/INR One Year Chart as of 11th of June 2026

Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) were net buyers of Indian equities for most of the period between 2004 and 2024, with only a few exceptions such as 2011, 2018 and 2022. However, the trend has changed. FPIs sold approximately $19 billion USD worth of Indian equities in 2025 and another $24 billion USD so far in 2026.

Question: Why are Foreign Investors Selling

One reason is that global investors today have alternatives. The growth of Artificial Intelligence related companies in the United States has created significant investment opportunities. At the same time, U.S Treasury yields hovering around 4.6% offer attractive risk-free returns in a strengthening dollar environment.

For many global investors, earning high returns in Dollar assets is preferable to taking exposure in emerging markets that face current account pressures from rising  Crude Oil prices and other energy costs.

Taxation is another factor. India taxes foreign investors at 20% on short-term capital gains and 12.5% on long-term gains. Meanwhile, competing financial centres such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand generally do not tax foreign investors’ capital gains.

Some global funds have argued that India should move closer to international norms, where capital gains are usually taxed in the investor’s home jurisdiction rather than the country where the investment is made. Higher post-tax returns would undoubtedly make Indian assets more attractive.

A stable Rupee would also reduce hedging costs, lower currency-risk premiums and improve the overall risk-reward profile for overseas investors. However, tax cuts alone cannot solve India’s problem.

The Real Issue is Balance of Payments

As Business Line columnist Lokeshwari Mam has pointed out, a significant portion of equity outflows consists of short-term speculative capital. Long-term capital tends to remain invested. This is why the decline in net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) should concern policymakers more than short-term fluctuations in portfolio flows.

Net FDI has fallen sharply from $28 billion in FY 2022-23 to just $7.7 billion in the year ended March 2026. This is a worrying trend because FDI is the most stable source of external financing. Unlike portfolio flows, it creates factories, jobs, exports and long-term productive capacity.

India therefore needs more than tax incentives. A genuine single window clearance system, reduced bureaucracy, easier business regulations and reforms in manufacturing remain essential. Attracting long-term capital should be a national priority.

The recent foreign buying of Indian bonds after tax cuts is encouraging. But relative to India’s current account financing requirements, it remains a small drop in the ocean.

For example, in FY 2025, the current account deficit was 0.6% of GDP. And in Q4, the current account became a surplus. Is it really that difficult to finance it’s small current account deficit?

India’s external vulnerability is determined not merely by a current account deficit, but by whether the capital account can be comfortably financed. A modest current account deficit still creates currency pressure if foreign capital inflows weaken (which we are seeing), while a larger deficit may be sustainable when capital inflows remain strong. The risk of sustained higher oil prices could widen the deficit, increasing India’s dependence on foreign capital at a time when global liquidity is tightening and U.S Treasury yields are rising.

Furthermore, hedging costs continue to erode much of the yield advantage that Indian bonds offer over U.S Treasuries. In that sense, active global money is likely to prefer Dollar assets over emerging-market debt or equities

India’s repo rate currently stands at 5.25%. The RBI’s decision to raise its inflation forecast to 5.1%, while lowering its GDP growth projection to 6.6% reveals where the shock from the Iran conflict is likely to be felt via higher inflation and weaker growth. For an economy that remains heavily dependent on imported oil, a depreciating Rupee only compounds the problem by increasing the cost of energy imports. 

In such an environment, the Monetary Policy Committee is unlikely to focus solely on growth. Currency stability, inflation expectations and the availability of foreign capital to finance India’s external requirements could become increasingly important considerations. If these pressures persist, the RBI should raise the repo rate, in the same manner other Asian central banks have done in recent weeks.

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Indian Rupee 20260515

India Insider: Rupee Under Pressure as Oil Prices Surge and Import Bills Rise

by with No Comment AssetsBen EzraBusinessCentral BanksCommoditiesExclusive ContentFeatured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsForexIndiaInvestingSpeculatorsWorld

Iranian War and Implications for India as Energy Prices Cause Vulnerability

India is currently facing mounting external economic pressures as rising global crude oil prices weaken the Rupee, widen the current account deficit, and increase the risk of imported inflation. As one of the world’s largest energy importing nations, India remains highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil markets. The recent surge in energy prices, combined with geopolitical tensions and volatility in currency markets, has intensified concerns among policymakers, economists and investors.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stepped up its intervention in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the Rupee, while the government is evaluating measures to reduce pressure on import billing. Rising fuel prices, weakening currency conditions and growing external imbalances have combined to create a challenging macroeconomic environment that may test India’s economic resilience in the coming years.

Indian Rupee 20260515

USD/INR Six Month Chart as of 15th March 2026

Gold and consumer electronics imports are increasingly being viewed as non-essential imports, and policymakers may consider restricting these categories in order to reduce stress on the current account deficit. Officials are concerned that a widening trade imbalance could place further downward pressure on the Rupee and increase dependence on foreign capital inflows.

The Rupee on Thursday fell to a record low near ₹95.95 per USD, making it one of Asia’s weakest performing currencies this year. The currency has erased most of the gains achieved following earlier RBI intervention measures aimed at curbing speculation in the Forex market. Analysts expect the Rupee to remain under pressure through 2026, especially if global crude oil prices continue to rise and significantly increase India’s import billings.

The impact of rising crude oil prices is becoming increasingly visible across the Indian economy. Private fuel retailers have either reduced diesel sales or raised prices in response to the rally in global oil markets, leaving state owned refiners to absorb a larger share of domestic demand. Long queues at fuel stations and rising transportation costs have intensified concerns over inflationary pressures.

Earlier today, State-owned fuel retailers raised fuel prices for the first time in nearly four years as New Delhi adjusted domestic pricing to reflect higher international crude prices following escalating tensions in Western Asia. Diesel and gasoline prices increased by more than 3%, even though Brent crude prices had risen by nearly 50% over the same period.

In New Delhi, diesel prices climbed to around ₹90.67 per litre, while gasoline prices rose to approximately ₹97.77 per litre. These are among the highest levels recorded since 2022 and reflect the growing burden of imported energy costs on the Indian economy.

Economists argue that the rise in fuel prices signals a gradual shift toward market based pricing rather than extensive government controls. Policymakers increasingly recognize that artificially suppressing fuel prices could worsen fiscal pressures and create larger external imbalances over time.

Currency Weakness and Monetary Policy Challenges

RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra recently remarked at an event in Switzerland that continued currency weakness may be “only a matter of time” if global energy prices remain elevated and capital flows become increasingly volatile.

Foreign outflows during the year have already exceeded previous levels, while a sustained rise in crude oil prices above $100 per barrel could significantly widen the trade deficit and push India towards another period of pressure on balance of payments.

In this climate, attracting foreign capital via various tax cuts or raising the interest rates is paramount to reduce the pressure on the currency. It’s already been seen that New Delhi is working on reducing taxes for foreigners investing in Indian bonds.

Rise of Inflationary Pressures

Although India’s headline inflation remains relatively contained and below the RBI’s 4% medium term target, imported inflation risks are steadily increasing.

Economists also believe the RBI may eventually be forced to maintain tighter monetary conditions or raise interest rates further if energy prices continue to accelerate.

The central bank has already raised interest rates to around 5.25% this year, but several economists argue that further tightening may still become necessary.

Historical Perspective and Structural Risks

Economic historians often compare the current situation with the oil shocks of the 1970s. During that period, the United States was heavily dependent on imported oil. The oil crises of 1973 and again in 1979 contributed to inflationary pressures, balance of payments stress, and periods of USD weakness.

However, economists note that today’s global environment is significantly different. The United States has become one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers, reducing its dependence on imported energy. As a result, rising oil prices no longer weaken the U.S Dollar in the same way they did during earlier oil shocks.

For countries like India, the impact remains severe. India imports the majority of its crude oil requirements. Higher global oil prices directly increase India’s import billing and create additional demands for USD.

As Economist Philip Verleger was quoted by Bloomberg, “when you are a major oil importing nation, you are not only paying more for crude itself, you are also paying more for the dollars required to purchase it.” India is now facing this realization again.

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India Rupee 20260416

Progression Upwards for Indian Rupee and Catalysts

by with No Comment AssetsBehavioral SentimentCentral BanksCommoditiesEquitiesFeatured HighlightsForexIndiaInvestingRisk ManagementSpeculatorsUncategorizedWorld

USD/INR Persistent Trajectory Remains in Force and Mid-Term Concerns

As of this writing the USD/INR is within the 93.2000 vicinity. The price of Gold is around $4,810.00 and Silver close to 79.50. Importantly, WTI Crude Oil is trading around $89.25. Global markets have turned in solid performances the past two weeks, this has been a two step progression for most investors. 

Indian financial institutions began to digest their worries regarding the Iranian war late in March – perhaps acknowledging the risks and ramifications, while adjusting outlooks. Then on Tuesday the 7th of April the establishment of a ceasefire was announced. However, after hitting a low of around the 92.2200 realm on the 8th of April, the USD/INR is back within higher ratios.

India Rupee 20260416

USD/INR Six Month Price Chart as of 16th April 2026

Yes, the USD/INR had been traversing above the 95.0000 ratio late in March, so it can be said the Indian Rupee has gotten stronger. Yet, there will not be many willing participants who will join a parade with the belief this lower trend can be sustained. The bullish trajectory of the USD/INR is not going to vanish.

On the 24th of October 2025, the USD/INR was near 87.7500. At this time last year the currency pair was close to 85.5000. A persistent and long-term move higher has been the theme in the USD/INR. Weakness in the Indian Rupee has been part of India’s economic story rather consistently for a handful of years. 

Narendra Modi has been in power since 2014, he is serving his third term as Prime Minister. His political party the BJP clearly has its chosen people within the Reserve Bank of India.

The government’s position of allowing the Indian Rupee to be weaker is not something they will want to state out loud as part of their mandate, but it is clearly not bothering them.

The pursuit of creating a stronger industrial and manufacturing base for India, including IT and software via good exchange rates for international clients is seen as a cornerstone to build demand. The quality of work and technology provided by the Indian workforce is good and this allows global clients to foster solid relationships with Indian companies.

However, the rise of the USD/INR to above the 95.0000 level in late March was a warning sign, that sometimes price velocity in Forex can become dangerous. And the Iranian war although enjoying a week and half of less noise, still could escalate into a problematic scenario for India that could cause additional concerns in Indian financial institutions who are trying to gauge their mid-term outlooks.

The USD/INR is an important part of this economic math and the prospect that higher energy costs, or in a worst case scenario – shortages incur hardship for Indian citizens and companies is an actual concern.

The current situation in the Hormuz Strait and availability of Crude Oil is significantly important for India. So is supply of LNG (liquefied natural gas) which Qatar, Oman and the UAE play a role. The supply of energy presents a glaring dark shadow for the prospects of the Indian economy should there be shortfalls. 

The 93.5000 resistance level has been durable since early April in the USD/INR. Stability of the exchange rate is crucial for a wide range of business in India, including banking and financial institutions active in the Bombay stock market – particularly since a weaker India Rupee opens the door to Forex concerns for foreign investors who do not have the ability to hedge if they are exposed via the INR too much. Foreign investors are needed in the Nifty indices to help values.

The near-term is likely going to remain a difficult path for the USD/INR and its outlook. The positive sentiment which has prevailed the past couple of weeks has been welcome and certainly stable conditions are hoped for so equilibrium can be kept. However, if the Iranian situation manifests into open military conflict again, or if there is a disruption of supply of energy that cannot be easily solved by India – then the USD/INR could once again face price velocity upwards that is uncomfortable.

While China may be getting the headlines regarding potential ramifications of its Crude Oil supply being threatened, India is estimated to have consumption that is ranked as the 3rd biggest globally. India’s ability to get a supply of energy from a diversified stable of sources is a key for the nation moving forward. 

The USD/INR will continue to move higher, the question is how fast? A slow steady rise in the currency pair – again, this will not be a spoken mandate by the Indian government – will continue. The fear of a rapid debasement is a concern. Financial institutions in India need steady emotions and are certainly hoping for the Iranian war to conclude with a sliver of optimism. 

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postre1

India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

by with No Comment AMT MarketsCommoditiesFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Why Russian Oil Should Be Treated Skeptically

As Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi for a bilateral summit, the mood in India’s capital is one of profound strategic tension. The core of the problem is India’s massive appetite for discounted Russian Crude Oil, which has shielded the economy from high energy prices but is now causing significant financial and geopolitical risks. This move comes at a time when India’s most important trade surpluses lies with the West, raising anxieties about U.S sanctions and shrinking strategic space.

Trapped Rupee Problem

Since the Ukraine war, Russia’s share of India’s Crude Oil imports has surged from under 2% to nearly 40%. This has simultaneously inflated India’s trade deficit with Russia to nearly $59 billion.

The transactions are largely settled in Indian Rupees (INR). Moscow has accumulated billions of Rupees in Indian banks. However, because the Rupee is not fully convertible on the global market, Russia has very limited ways to use this huge surplus within India. These billions of Rupees are essentially ‘trapped liquidity’ – a problem neither country can easily solve.

postre1
India – Russia Bilateral Merchandise Trade Chart from 2017 – 2024

The Kremlin, meanwhile, is shifting its financial allegiance. It is preparing to issue Yuan denominated sovereign bonds, a decisive step that deepens its reliance on Beijing’s financial system amid a cut off from the Western financial system. This financial trajectory clearly signals the next logical step: Russia will inevitably demand that India begin paying for its oil shipments in Chinese Yuan (CNY).

Structural Risk of Holding Chinese Yuan

India has never been comfortable holding Chinese Yuan or settling trades in the currency. That’s partly strategic as New Delhi wants to protect its geopolitical autonomy and position itself as the democratic anchor of the Global South while staying closely aligned with the West.

But Russia’s financial plumbing is now increasingly routed through China. As the Kremlin becomes more deeply integrated into China’s banking and payments system, its dependence on the Yuan becomes structural. Moscow needs Yuan not only to service Chinese creditors, but also to pay for its expanding list of manufactured imports from China. The Ruble, being a largely non-convertible currency, simply cannot support this scale of trade.

For now, Russia-China trade is balanced enough because Beijing still buys large quantities of Russian energy. But this equilibrium can shift quickly. As the Ukraine war drags on and Moscow’s defense spending rises, the Kremlin will be forced to rely even more heavily on Chinese financing, Chinese goods, and ultimately the Yuan itself, tightening its economic dependency on Beijing.

When that moment arrives, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will be forced to accumulate Yuan as part of its Forex reserves to ensure the continued flow of oil. This decision, born of necessity, introduces a structural vulnerability into India’s financial system as the adoption of Yuan as a reserve currency subject to China’s capital controls.

Risks of Holding the Yuan

China may have both the onshore (CNY) and offshore (CNH) Yuan, but the currency is ultimately controlled by the PBOC, which makes it a risky reserve asset for India. In a crisis, Beijing’s capital controls could restrict liquidity and prevent the RBI from freely converting yuan into hard currency like the USD, effectively trapping India’s capital.

Beyond this financial rigidity, large Yuan holdings also expose India to CCP driven political risk, tying its external stability to China’s domestic decisions. And unlike the Dollar which can be deployed anywhere, Yuan reserves are usable mainly for transactions with China or countries in its financial orbit, sharply limiting India’s strategic and financial flexibility.

Strategic Win for Beijing

For Beijing, this shift delivers a double strategic win, cementing the Yuan as the dominant settlement currency across Eurasia especially among countries squeezed by Western sanctions and it allows the yuan to slip into India’s financial system indirectly, not through Chinese pressure but through Russia’s growing dependence on Chinese finance and India’s reliance on discounted Russian oil.

For Moscow, this is a reluctant compromise: giving up some monetary autonomy in exchange for necessary financial support from China.

For India, however, it introduces a new long term structural risk with a slow but steady Yuan encroachment into its trade and reserve system, operating alongside the dominant U.S Dollar. The oil corridor that was meant to offer an independent strategic opportunity for India is now becoming a channel which Beijing can strengthen its monetary footprint. In this complex triangle, India risks paying a dangerous tactical long-term price for its energy security.

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India Insider: Reserve Bank of India Intervention is Limited

by with No Comment AMT MarketsBehavioral SentimentFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Reserve Bank of India Intervention is Limited

After weeks of steady appreciation due to Reserve Bank of India intervention on the 15th of October, the Indian Rupee has now returned to the same 88.72 levels against the USD before the policy action was enacted. The RBI’s recent offensive against speculators may have calmed the market temporarily, but it reflects a reactionary and short-term approach to deeper structural pressures facing India’s external administrative policies regarding the USD/INR.

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USD/INR Three Month Chart as of 5th November 2025

Despite the Reserve Bank of India’s efforts to influence the cash forward market, where Dollar shorts rose by 6 billion USD in September to $59 billion, fundamentals suggest that Rupee weakness is not purely speculative. It is a rational market adjustment due to rising trade barriers amid U.S tariffs on India’s merchandise exports. The added uncertainty regarding trade caused the Rupee to naturally absorb external shocks. Merchandise exports to the U.S fell 12% in September year on year, according to official India data, prompting some calls for government relief.

India’s Foreign Remittances & H1-B Visa Fee Hike

According to World Bank data, India received about 137.7 billion USD in personal remittances from abroad in 2024. From that amount, around $40 billion is coming from the United States. The Trump administration raised the cost of H1-B visa fees from below 10,000 USD to nearly $100,000. And there is now also an increased likelihood of measures aimed at limiting digitally delivered software services to the U.S from India. These combined measures would substantially reduce Dollar receipts via exports of technology driven software and IT services, as well as remittances from a reduction of workers on temporary U.S visas providing on site services to U.S clients. USD inflow has been crucial for India’s balance of payment’s stability.

Reduction of USD reserves when the trade deficit is already rising because of hikes caused by tariffs on India’s exports would widen the current account deficit. Concerns about a decrease in remittances leading to a potentially significant decline of India’s USD reserve ability is possibly discouraging the India Reserve Bank to voluntarily expend reserves to support the Rupee.

Service Exports Cushion India’s Balance of Payments:

India’s total service exports touched 400 Billion USD over the past year with a predominant amount coming from the U.S. In other words, India has had a $202 billion in services trade surplus over the last 12 months, which covered almost 114% of India’s merchandise trade deficit in 2024-25.

India’s goods trade deficit is matched by a services surplus, plus net foreign personal remittances. This USD equation is under threat because of prolonged paralysis from stubborn US and India trade negotiations debating Russian Oil usage and the U.S demand to allow agricultural products into India.

Foreign Investors Selling Indian Equities

In addition, the Indian Rupee is not getting support from investment portfolio inflows. A shortfall of AI related avenues in the nation’s tech sector, and perhaps because of valuations considered too rich, foreign Investors have pulled 17 billion USD so far this year. This sum is more than any other emerging market, which is eating away at the Reserve Bank of India’s FX reserves too.

Global and India-specific uncertainties spurred by the Trump administration’s actions are setting off a retreat of footloose portfolio capital invested into India’s equity and bond markets. If the Reserve Bank of India was confident that inflows of foreign capital would replenish reserves it would likely help the Indian Rupee, and thus investor confidence coming from abroad.

Policy Irony and the Limits of Intervention

The U.S. remains India’s largest export market, but new levies of 50% tariffs are hurting labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, leather, footwear, and gems & jewelry.

While concerns about imported inflation are valid, the benefits of a weaker Rupee should not be overlooked. A mild depreciation could boost India’s service exports, improve the balance of payments, and partly offset the effects of U.S. tariffs on merchandise exports.

A material improvement in U.S and India trade relations is needed. Until a restoration is achieved in relations and a merchandise surplus is possible, alongside healthy services and remittance inflows occurring again, the Rupee’s weakness is likely to persist. In the meantime, Reserve Bank of India interventions could prove to be a short term tactic that proves vulnerable mid-term to the influence of market forces known and unexpected.

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India Insider: U.S Credit Crunch vs. Indian Banking Paralysis

by with No Comment Featured HighlightsFinancial InstitutionsIndia

India Insider: U.S Credit Crunch vs. Indian Banking Paralysis

When the U.S suffered a severe credit crunch in the early 1990s, the triggers were clear: the collapse of the leveraged buyout (LBO) boom, commercial real estate price corrections, and the failure of Savings and Loans (S&L) Associations, created the need for a $160 billion taxpayer bailout. Regulators, determined to act tough, declared many banks undercapitalized. The result was a nationwide squeeze from 1991 to 1993, where capital shortages – not liquidity, froze credit markets.

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Reserve Bank of India Borrowing Rates 1935 to 2025

Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan slashed the Federal Funds rate to 3%, but banks couldn’t lend without capital. The unique twist was that, even as lending slowed, competition among borrowers pushed prime lending rates to 6%. This gave banks a fat 3–4% spread. Greenspan let this persist for nearly three years, enabling banks to earn profits equal to more than 10% of assets. With capital requirements at 8%, the windfall repaired balance sheets. By 1994, the U.S had exited the crisis and returned to strong growth.

India’s trajectory was very different. For decades, the country ran structurally high interest rates, which in theory should have allowed banks to recapitalize through spreads, just like the U.S. However, the reality was distorted by governance failures. Public sector banks (PSBs) , which dominate the system did not use their spreads to strengthen capital. Instead, politically connected lending to oligarchs and large industrial houses left the banks saddled with non-performing assets (NPAs).

I witnessed the aftermath up close in 2019 while working at Edelweiss Brokerage. Shadow banks were stressed, some private banks were crumbling, and PSBs were finally forced to acknowledge their bad loans. The selloff in the banking stocks were brutal that year, Catholic Syrian Bank’s IPO, one of the prominent South Indian banks went undersubscribed. To counter the slowdown, the government slashed corporate taxes from 30% to 22% to stimulate capital expenditure.

Unlike the U.S, India’s stress was on the asset side. Corporates were dragged into Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) proceedings, where assets were monetized through painful restructurings. Piramal Finance bought DHFL at 30 cents on the dollar, and ArcelorMittal acquired Essar Steel at 90 cents. This was the hard clean up the system had avoided for years.

The NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government made the right call in restructuring the banking sector. Weak public sector banks were merged with stronger ones. Yes, it was costly. Households bore the burden via higher taxes, hidden charges, and high borrowing rates. But at least the problem was confronted.

The contrast is striking. The U.S endured a sharp three-year crunch, recapitalized its banks through spreads and market discipline, and bounced back quickly. India endured nearly a decade of paralysis, requiring taxpayer recapitalizations, corporate asset fire-sales, and systemic restructuring. The eventual stability allowed private sector banks to quietly capture market share from their weaker state-owned peers.

The lesson is simple: interest rate spreads can heal banks only if governance is strong. Without accountability, as India’s PSB saga shows, high rates merely tax households and businesses without fixing the system.

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India Insider: Speculation, IPO Mania, and Capital Erosion

by with No Comment AMT MarketsFeatured HighlightsIndia

India Insider: Speculation, IPO Mania, and Capital Erosion

A speculative frenzy is reflected nowadays via India social media around quarterly results and IPOs. Animated talk about investment potential in India can be compared in some respects to the Dot-com bubble in the U.S which grew in stature into the late 1990’s and peaked in March of 2020 before imploding. Retail speculators in India rush into untested technology stocks hoping for quick profits, often without understanding the businesses. Avoiding a Dot-com like crash is important.

Hedge funds and institutions with their superior supply of capital often speculate across stocks, bonds, Forex and commodities as part of their strategies. However, retail investors should only purchase individual corporate stocks like pieces of businesses which they want to own when they have the ability. Market fluctuations lower can be used to buy quality companies when intrinsic value has been discounted allowing investors with limited funds to take advantage of stock volatility.

Charlie Munger, the right hand man of Warren Buffett, when asked what the secret of running Berkshire Hathaway Inc. was replied, “Warren likes to say, just tell us the bad news, the good news can wait. So people trust us in that (decision making process), and that helps prevent mistakes from escalating into disasters. When you’re not managing for quarterly earnings and you’re managing only for the long pull, you don’t give a damn what the next quarter’s earnings look like.” And this has proven to be advice that all investors can learn from.

Lessons from Yes Bank and Ola Electric:

Many speculative investors rely on technical charts using support and resistance patterns for trading decisions. This frequent buying and selling enriches brokers but rarely investors. Technical trading entices because it often is easier to look at a chart and feel that by glancing at past results you are able to predict the future, but this frequently proves to be incorrect. Fundamentals should always be a large part of investment decisions.

Yes Bank is a classic example. Investors assumed strong fundamentals in 2018, but allegations against founder Rana Kapoor revealed critical issues which proved to be damaging. The Reserve Bank of India stepped into the mess, forcing a consortium of banks to inject equity. Small investors who bought the dips blindly learned the cost of ignoring fundamentals and were hurt financially.
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Yes Bank Share Value from 9th of August 2018 to 9th of August 2019 in India Rupees

Another example unfortunately is Ola Electric Mobility Ltd which highlights a similar trap. Ola’s 2024 IPO raised 75 billion Indian Rupees ($900 million USD) at a value of 76 INR per share. It was hailed as a ‘BYD of India’, and despite high valuation warnings, investors pushed share value towards 160 INR. Predictably as cash burn mounted and with no operating profitability, Ola Electrical Mobility value soon fell below the IPO price and speculators who dreamed big soon began to feel like they had lost. The Yes Bank and Ola Electric Mobility cases demonstrate the dangers of investing outside one’s circle of competence.

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Ola Electric Mobility One Year Chart as of 17th September 2025

Valuations and Investor Behavior:

From October 2022 to October 2024, Indian markets moved significantly higher, stretching valuations beyond earnings. Even after U.S. Liberation Day tariffs triggered a pullback in India, investors continued pouring money into mutual funds through SIPs (Systematic Investment Plans), ignoring glaring fundamental problems. This raises concerns and creates doubts about whether SIP passive investing is wise without understanding individual businesses.

Investment becomes more intelligent when it is done with a business like approach. As Warren Buffett said, “the stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient.” But patience should not mean overpaying for growth stories. Predicting future earnings is difficult, and paying lofty prices for stocks in the EV, battery, and micro-processing chip sectors based only on expectations can be dangerous.

When competition or innovation shifts, stock prices collapse as Ola Electric Mobility has shown. True investing is businesslike. It requires understanding, discipline, and buying below intrinsic values. Chasing hype, speculation, and every new IPO can lead to erosion of capital. Smaller investors can do better and they should desire to study fundamentals in order to make good decisions.

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India Insider: Labor Productivity and Rising Household Debt

by with No Comment Featured HighlightsIndiaRisk Management

India Insider: Labor Productivity and Rising Household Debt

The desire for India to become a fast growing economy can be alluring, but without proper distribution of income and improved labor codes, this remains a major challenge to achieve. During coronavirus, acute problems were faced by those working in private enterprises. While some businesses and institutions supported their employees, many people were left behind without social protective measures.

According to Business Line newspaper analysis, from July 2022 to June 2023, an average salaried Indian male made 20,666 Rupees ($236 USD) and a woman made 15,722 Rupees ( $180 USD) per month.

Experience tells us that lower salaries in the rural areas are pervasive. Many private sector nurses, schoolteachers, and other service workers earn less than the international poverty line of $3 per day (around 250 Rupees per current Forex). Sometimes due to extensive workforce supply, some educated people must work blue collar service jobs additionally to make their ends meet.

Agriculture and Low Productivity:

Wage disparity and underemployment exists rampantly. Half of India’s labor force works in agriculture, where productivity is poor. In agriculture, farmers are both producers and consumers. There are barriers in food supply and demand for agricultural products. Farmers need access to local markets where their buyers can afford to purchase their produce. Without solid markets or better road infrastructure to reach them, many rural areas have less incentive to improve productivity.

As a result, many farmers produce low volumes. This is also one of the reasons why New Delhi is reluctant to permit U.S imports of agricultural and dairy products. Smaller farmers cannot afford to invest in education, which hinders their efforts to move into industries with higher wages. Without increasing labor productivity and better opportunities, most of the population will continue to work in agriculture.

Stagnant Wages, Informal Work and Problems in Micro-Finance:

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India’s Micro-Finance Lenders Culminative Returns Past Year

A large portion of the workforce is employed via informal and low-paying jobs. If wage growth does not keep pace with increased productivity, domestic consumption will remain weak, making the economy more fragile during global downturns. Drivers and gig workers provide some insights because of their inability to make ends meet. Minimum wage policies are lacking for many gig workers. Employees work higher hours in these enterprises. Yet another reason why Indian households prefer to prepare their children for government jobs.

India’s micro lending industry is under stress as delinquencies rise at an alarming pace. This has prompted the Reserve Bank of India to intervene and impose fines on lenders charging excessive interest rates. Loan disbursements shrank 13.5% year-on-year, and shares of some small finance banks have fallen, this as they have been forced to set aside higher provisions for bad loans.

Total loans outstanding in the industry are around 3.75 lakh crore rupees ($43 billion USD) in financial year 2025, with non-housing retail loans accounting for nearly 55% of total household debt. Small ticket loans were meant to ensure financial inclusion in underserved areas. The RBI defines microfinance as collateral-free loans to households with annual incomes of up to 3 lakh Rupees (approximately $3,400 USD).

But when wages do not rise in line with inflation, households begin to borrow to cover deficits, often at high interest rates. This creates risk for small finance banks when borrowers default, besides many consumers who are clearly struggling. A bank employee in Tamil Nadu has said loan disbursements are now scrutinized more closely, and applicants with monthly EMIs – equated monthly installments – above 10,000 Rupees ($115 USD) are no longer eligible for micro-loans.

Job creation in the Manufacturing:

Despite media portrayals of India’s manufacturing ascent, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik offered a compelling remark paraphrased here which points out obstacles ahead, ‘what made manufacturing a vehicle for transformational growth was its ability to generate productivity while drawing unskilled labor from traditional farming’. Rodrik seems to believe manufacturing remains a lower income sector in India due to its large work force and inability to transform efficiently, while also facing globalization problems from other Asian competitors.

The reason why manufacturing companies in India can pay lower salaries is because of high unemployment ratios and a steady supply of new graduates every year, making it easy to find new employees. Wages don’t see much improvement because workers are replaced easily. Many employees working in manufacturing actually have engineering and Masters’ degree backgrounds. Their average salary is around 15,000 Rupees a month ($170 USD), the same amount paid to low skilled employees who have technician diplomas.

India needs to work on improving core manufacturing capabilities, creating better infrastructure via land reforms and logistical capabilities. Implementing a fair minimum wage policy would also influence the economy via better household wages. Yes, inflation is a concern, but India’s aspiration to become a $10 trillion economy will remain hard to attain unless coordinated policy changes occur.

Notes: 1 USD = 87.5 Rupees

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India Insider: Booming GDP & Fragile Foundations of Growth

by with No Comment AMT MarketsCommoditiesFeatured Highlights

India Insider: Booming GDP & Fragile Foundations of Growth

India’s economic footprint on the global stage is expanding significantly each year. As the world’s largest democracy, the nation achieved a remarkable 7.4% GDP growth rate January to March of this fiscal year. Yet, beneath this impressive headline, job creation remains tepid, overshadowed by slowing foreign direct investments (FDI) and lower corporate investments from India’s domestic market.

Despite Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative to attract manufacturing into India and boost jobs, the manufacturing share of GDP has stubbornly clung to 16% for the last decade. While India’s services sector accounts around 55% of GDP, the IT and allied services sectors contributes a mere 3-4% of total employment. Even after the last two decades in which India’s Asian neighbors have shifted labor force out of agriculture and into high scale manufacturing, 45% of India’s workforce still are employed in agriculture and aligned services constituting only 15-17% of GDP.

Speculative Capital, Excessive Credit and Rising Financial Risk

Between 2003 and 2023, India attracted approximately $275 Billion USD from foreign capital inflows, encompassing mostly equity and debt foreign portfolio investments. These capital injections are speculative in nature, primarily chasing returns in financial markets, rather than being directly invested into long-term productive infrastructure like manufacturing and export oriented industries.

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Foreign Portfolio Investment into India 2003 to 2023

Interestingly, India’s public sector banks especially between 2008 and 2015 aggressively lent to infrastructure, real estate and capital intensive projects. The state owned banks tried to fill the gap left behind by private investors. A substantial share of these loans later turned into non-performing loans, exacerbating a duel crisis as corporate and bank balance sheets came under severe stress within a few years. The government of India stepped in and injected 3.1 lakh crore Rupees ($45 Billion USD) to recapitalize the struggling banks, and also orchestrated mergers of weaker banks with stronger banks. India’s citizens helped cover these costs via higher taxes and hidden banking charges.

Reserve Bank of India: FX Reserves and Liquidity Dynamics 

As of financial year 2025, the RBI’S Foreign Exchange Reserves stand at around $696 billion USD. While a stronger reserve buffer is crucial for maintaining external stability, the Reserve Bank of India’s purchase of foreign currency to build reserves leads to problems with domestic Rupee liquidity and creates liabilities for the RBI’s balance sheet. Unless it’s not fully absorbed via Open Market operations, it will end up as excess liquidity in the banking system.

Post 2020 and the Covid19 pandemic, loose monetary policy and excess liquidity within the banking system has culminated with more reckless lending. Unsecured retail credit particularly in personal loans, credit cards and consumer finance is troubling. Non-banking financial companies (shadow banking) and fintech enterprises also expanded rapidly into this segment and now pose risks.

India Falling into Debt Trap 

Per a recent survey conducted by the RBI,  household financial savings have sharply declined to a five decade low of 5.1% of GDP in FY2023, down from 11.5% in 2021. Concurrently, household liabilities have risen, particularly in the unsecured credit segment.

Delinquencies in small ticket personal loans and “Buy Now, Pay Later“ programs are on the rise, prompting the RBI to intervene recently with tightening of personal loan norms in late 2023. This dynamic suggests that excessive credit creation, unaccompanied by productive or real income growth, is fueling a fragile boom in consumption backed predominately by debt especially among middle and lower income groups.

Lower Net Foreign Direct Investment amid Higher Repatriation

Even with coordinated efforts from the likes of Apple, Foxconn (Hon Hai Technology Group) and other electronics companies setting up facilities, and the assembly of manufactured goods like iPhones as part of the “China Plus“ strategy, a more comprehensive method of doing business and improved proactive FDI policy is needed. Overall results are still falling short. Evidence shows many companies continue to choose Vietnam and Mexico over India, which is clearly reflected in the lower net FDI figures in India’s Balance of Payments. In financial year 2024-25, net FDI fell 96% to $353 million USD, caused by a surge of money being repatriated out of India led by foreign companies, and also increased foreign investments by Indian companies to other nations, per the Hindu magazine.

The irony is that India needs foreign capital to finance its current accounts deficit, long-term capital investment would boost jobs and increase wages. As the central Indian government practices an austerity drive and its corporations show an unwillingness to invest, India needs higher foreign capital at this crucial juncture. How will India achieve this task? Without better employment and raising wages, India’s celebrated growth faces risks from underlying cracks.