Towards a Definition of Israel's National Interests
Opinion: The following article is commentary and its views are solely those of the author. This article was first published the 24th of July via The Angry Demagogue.
Ever since the end of the first Lebanon War, Israeli military strategy has moved from active and aggressive defense of the homeland and its citizens via a policy of taking the fight to enemy territory to passive defense based on the threat of massive force – in other words, deterrence. The object was to create a situation where the enemy feared attacking us and to use our military force as a reason to go to the negotiating table. The assumption was that if we were strong enough, we could make concessions and deal with whatever situation arose. “The IDF is strong enough to deal with it” was the phrase de jour. Israel was at peace with Egypt and Syria’s Hafez Assad had no interest in a frontal attack after his air force was embarrassed in 1982 by losing over 60 aircraft in dogfights with Israel as well as 29 of their 30 SAM anti-aircraft batteries.
The PLO moved to Tunisia after the Lebanon War and other enemies, Iraq and Iran, were too far to be a non-terrorist threat. After Begin destroyed the Iraqi nuclear program, “only” terrorism seemed to be a threat. Terrorism though, to the Israeli leadership did not pose a “existential” threat to Israel, as Yitzchak Rabin was quick to repeat after Oslo, so deterrence seemed like a good military strategy for existential threats.
The Challenge of October 7: Part 3 – Security and Foreign Policy
On the diplomatic front, the Oslo accords of 1993 brought a thaw to the loneliness of the diplomats, but the diplomatic goals were still the same – get countries to like us by providing assistance where we can and by explaining how we are trying to come to a peace agreement with the Palestinians – and anyway, they are worse than we are. In diplomacy, like in the military realm, deterrence was the tool and the goal was quiet. In both realms of foreign policy reacting to the situation was the main tactic as both the generals and diplomats guiding principle to move the country forward was “quiet and prosperity will eventually lead to peace”. The political class might have disagreed amongst themselves with the details, but both the right and the left were sure that actively seeking out victory in foreign policy was not in the cards.
On the military side, the assumption was that the Israeli Air Force could deter any major attack while “minor” terrorist attacks and occasional localized rocket attacks did not threaten the existence of the country. Diplomatically, there were goals like having the U.S and other countries move their embassy to Jerusalem or moderating the inevitable anti-Israel resolutions in the UN and its agencies, but they did not seem to feel that the country had much to offer to the world around them or that Israel had any diplomatic heft so that was the sum of foreign policy.
The diplomats and politicians were circling the world with the thought that the more we meet people the less they will hate us. The politicians and diplomats forgot Lord Palmerston’s notion that countries “have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” The military leaders lost interest in protecting the people, forgetting that in a democratic country individuals count even if the end of their individual lives are not “existential” to the country.
What has October 7th taught us and how do we move forward in our international and security affairs? We will go back to the main theme again and that is the “Jewish people and Israeli persons (Israeli, because there are non-Jewish citizens who need the protection and care of Israel’s security and foreign policies). The main discussion has been about the defense concept, the “conceptzia” in Anglicized Hebrew, where one could deter one’s enemies with a combination of walls, destruction of buildings and providing them with a “good life”. Protecting the people seemed to be secondary as the entire south spent weeks nearly every year in their safe rooms and shelters. Even in the year after October 7, the northern towns were sitting ducks to Hezbollah fire with no attempt to take the fight to their territory. The idea that in a democratic country the military strategy was to allow one’s citizens to be shot at by a foreign power on a regular basis is a strategy that cares about ideas and concepts of peace and land but not about the lives of one’s citizens.
Even in the north, where most of the pre-October 7 military planning occurred, there was an understanding that Hezbollah would be able to conquer some border communities – but that they would eventually be pushed back. Besides the defeatist attitude of the generals, it amazes that these same military minds could not imagine what would happen to these communities under the occupation of Hezbollah – and the politicians that approved these plans did not understand the psychological harm to its own citizens of allowing the enemy conquer its towns and the euphoria that would occur in Arab and Moslem lands who want to destroy Israel.
But we are not here to go through the failures but rather move forward with the reality that October 7 has presented us. Simcha Goldin, who fought for 12 years for the return of his son from the hands of Hamas, spoke during that time (and still does) about a return to values. This goes to the heart of where we need military doctrine to go. A value-full doctrine starts with the value of the lives of a country’s along with victory over one’s enemies. What a military doctrine post-October 7 cannot say is that we will allow our towns to be occupied and we will allow homes to be damaged by rockets or drones or anti-tank rockets, that we will allow our citizens and soldiers to be shot at so long as the “quiet” can last for a few months or even years.
Pre-October 7 deterrence meant that both sides were deterred, post-October7 deterrence can only mean that Israel deters its enemies by taking the military initiative and not only reacting. The value of the safety and comfort of all citizens needs to be at the center of Israel’s military doctrine. Victory over enemies is the only thing that can ensure that, as we know now (but should have known then).
As for Israel’s vital interests, one must be the fate of Jews around the world. That has military and diplomatic angles. Antisemitism cannot be tolerated in “allied” countries and both the Mossad and the foreign ministry must be activated to fight it. While it might not be acceptable for one to operate a spy network in an “allied” country, once antisemitism becomes rampant and Jews lives and livelihoods are at stake, a military response is warranted. That is not to mean tanks and jets and drones, but Mossad operations that put fear into antisemites need be planned and activated.
Diplomatically, simple protests by the foreign ministry will not suffice. The government must make it known, via whatever non-military power it has, that antisemitism is not acceptable. If that means recalling ambassadors or making certain diplomats persona non-grata or if that means creating a real diplomatic crisis, so be it. Antisemitism of the type formed after October 7 needs to be fought as terrorism is – on multiple fronts.
Regarding foreign policy in general, Israel has never established, even informally, its “vital national interests”. The post-October 7 world is forcing Israel to do what it ignored for the last 80 years.
Here is a modest proposal of key points of Israel’s national interests. Obviously these need to be fleshed out (maybe in a future piece) and certainly these points themselves can be debated. The problem is – Israel has never had this debate. Here is a start:
– Free movement of Israel’s people and goods throughout the world.
– Support and defense of diaspora Jewish communities wherever they are.
– Support and defense of non-Israeli communities of Israel’s minority groups – for example, Druze, Bahai, Circassian.
– Unrelenting and unapologetic defense of the country’s borders, citizens and infrastructure.
– Defense of its Jewish and democratic traditions, freedoms and values.
– Unrelenting fight against terrorism against Israeli citizens, diaspora Jews and allied countries.
– Establishment of alliances that support Israel’s national interests.
– Self-reliance on matters of national importance such as the defense industry, food and energy production.
The above points are just that – broad points. There is no expectation and there should be no expectation that everyone should agree on the details. For example, “defense of borders” might mean different things to different people, but the argument should only be on what those borders are and not on if Israel ought to vigorously defend its borders. So too, with the “Jewish and democratic traditions” and each point above. But disagreement on the details of the main points is different than disagreement on the outline of Israel’s national interests.
As we have stated, Israel’s security and foreign policies have mostly been reactive over the past few decades. We can blame the right or the left and anyone we don’t agree with, but the main problem has been a lack of understanding by the country’s decision makers of Israel’s national interests. Once Israel understands what that is, it can act pro-actively to further its own interests and not only to react against localized or even globalized threats to the country and its well-being.
Disclaimer: the views expressed in this opinion article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily the opinions reflected by angrymetatraders.com or its associated parties.
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